MARK SHAFFER AND BILL LUKE SHAFFER, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Mark and Bill Luke Shaffer appealed their convictions for grand theft and dealing in stolen property. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed their convictions but vacated portions of their sentences imposing court costs and attorney's fees that were assessed without proper notice and procedural compliance.
The court affirmed the convictions but vacated the portions of the sentences imposing court costs under sections 960.20 and 943.25 and attorney's fees under section 27.56 because the trial court failed to provide proper notice and comply with statutory procedures. The court affirmed the imposition of restitution but remanded to strike restitution as a condition of parole, since only the Parole and Probation Commission has authority to impose parole conditions.
[1] A trial court must provide prior notice to a defendant before assessing certain statutory costs.
[2] Assessments of court costs and attorney's fees against an indigent defendant require compliance with statutory notice and hearing requirements.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because appellants did not receive prior notice that these costs would be assessed against them, these assessments must be stricken.”
Establishes that notice is required before assessing costs against defendants previously adjudged insolvent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMark and Bill Luke Shaffer were convicted of grand theft and dealing in stolen property. The trial court sentenced them and imposed various costs and …
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HANLON, MORTON J., Associate Judge.
Appellants Mark and Bill Luke Shaffer appeal their respective judgments and sentences for grand theft and dealing in stolen property. While we find no reversible error in appellants’ primary contention, we agree that the trial court erred in imposing various costs, attorney’s fees, and conditions of parole against appellants.
We note specifically that the trial court ordered both appellants, who previously had been adjudged insolvent, to pay costs of $10, $2, and $1, pursuant to section 960.20 and section 943.25(4) and (8), Florida Statutes (1981). Because appellants did not receive prior notice that these costs would be assessed against them, these assessments must be stricken. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984); Kerney v. State, 445 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Our decision is without prejudice to the state to tax these costs in accordance with the procedure outlined in Jenkins.
In sentencing appellants, the trial court also orally imposed additional court costs of $55 and $250 in attorney’s fees against each appellant for his defense by the public defender. Section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes the assessment of these costs and fees against an indigent defendant upon compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of that section. Jenkins; Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). See also Flá.R. Crim.P. 3.720(d)(1). Our review of the record discloses, however, that the trial court entered its order without following the procedures and requirements outlined by section 27.56 and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). See Bruton v. State, 418 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Gaylord v. State, 413 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Accordingly, we vacate these portions of appellants’ judgments and remand to the trial court for proper consideration of these matters.1
Finally, Mark Shaffer asserts that the trial court erred in assessing restitution and the above court costs and attorney’s fees under section 27.56 as conditions of parole. Although a court is not precluded from recommending conditions of parole, the Parole and Probation Commission alone is invested with the statutory authority to impose such conditions. Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); § 947.13(l)(b); Fla.Stat. (1981). In light of our foregoing determination, we need not further address court costs and attorney’s fees under section 27.56. However, we affirm the imposition of restitution,2 but remand to the trial court with directions to strike that portion of Mark Shaffer’s judgment mandating the payment of restitution as a condition of parole.
In summation, we AFFIRM appellant’s convictions; VACATE the portions of the final judgments assessing court costs and attorney’s fees under section 27.56; and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and RYDER, J., concur. . The written judgment rendered against each appellant reflected imposition of “additional court costs in the sum of $42,” as opposed to the $55 orally pronounced by the trial judge. In addition, the written judgment entered against Bill Luke Shaffer failed to reflect the $250 in attorney’s fees pronounced in open court. Our decision to vacate and remand this portion of the judgment will allow the trial court to rectify these inconsistencies.
. Under this court’s holding in Goodson v. State, 400 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), appellants’ failure to object to the imposition of restitution at sentencing precludes them from contesting its validity on appeal. See also Barlow v. State, 388 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)…e the fee is set and the lien attaches. Sec. 27.56(7), Fla.Stat. (1979); Gryca v. State, 315 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). McGeorge, 386 So. 2d at 30 (emphasis added). See also Thomas v. State, 486 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Shaffer v. State, 446 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Cf. Mays v. State, 519 So. 2d 618 (Fla.1988) (due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to assessment of costs under section 27.3455). Notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to assessment of costs is…
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Cliburn v. State, 510 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…Florida law. The fact that the court allowed the defendant to request a hearing on certain of these costs after the costs had already been imposed cannot change this result. See Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984); [*1157] Shaffer v. State, 446 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); McGeorge v. State, 386 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); § 27.56(1), Fia. Stat.(1983). The imposition of the aforesaid restitution costs, appellate costs, and all other costs as contained in the sentence under review is therefore…
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Thorpe v. State, 453 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…(1983), authorizes assessment of the challenged costs and fees against an indigent defendant after compliance with the notice and hearing requirements specified in section 27.56(7). Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla.1984); Shaffer v. State, 446 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). See also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(d)(1). Our review of the record discloses that the trial court ordered payment of these costs without affording appellant adequate notice…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Goodson v. State, 400 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Samuel S.J. Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Barlow v. State, 388 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
- Gaylord v. State, 413 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Zdenka Slomovic v. McLOON, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Kerney v. State, 445 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- City OF Vero Beach v. Larry Catron Invs., Inc., 445 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Bruton v. State, 418 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)