STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
CURTIS MITCHELL SAMMONS, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of three first-degree grand theft charges against Curtis Sammons involving motor vehicles valued at $20,000 or more. The court reversed, holding that first-degree grand theft charges may be brought for motor vehicles meeting the $20,000 value threshold, even though motor vehicle theft is elsewhere classified as a third-degree felony.
First-degree grand theft charges may be brought for motor vehicles valued at $20,000 or more. The statute's enumeration of motor vehicles as a category subject to third-degree felony penalties recognizes they should be treated at least as third-degree felonies regardless of value, but does not preclude first-degree grand theft charges when the vehicle's value reaches $20,000 or more.
[1] Theft of a motor vehicle valued at $20,000 or more may be charged as first-degree grand theft, even if the statute also classifies theft of a motor vehicle as a third-deg…
[2] The enumeration of certain kinds of property in a theft statute as lesser felonies recognizes that stealing such property is at least a third-degree felony, but does not…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the enumeration of certain kinds of property in section (2)(b) of the theft statute is a recognition that stealing certain kinds of property should be treated at least as third degree felonies regardless of the value of such property but that first degree grand theft may be charged where that property has a value of $20,000 or more”
Establishes the court's statutory interpretation that section (2)(b)'s enumeration of motor vehicles sets a minimum felony level but does not preclude first-degree charges under section (2)(a) for high-value vehicles
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSammons was charged with three counts of first-degree grand theft: (1) theft of a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette valued at $20,000 or more on July 26, 1982; …
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RYDER, Judge.
The state appeals an order granting appellee Sammons’ motions to dismiss the three informations filed against him for first degree grand theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). We reverse.
The first information alleged that on July 26, 1982, appellee committed grand theft with respect to a 1981 Chevrolet Corvette, “said property being of the value of $20,-000 or more lawful money.” The second information stated that on March 28, 1983, appellee committed grand theft with respect to a 1978 Mercedes 450SL, “said property being of the value of $20,000 or more lawful money.” The third information alleged that between July 1 and July 30, 1982, appellee committed grand theft with respect to another 1981 Chevrolet Corvette, “said property being of the value of $20,000 or more lawful money.”
The First District Court of Appeal recently addressed the same issue which is now before us. In Davis v. State, 445 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), the court explained:
With respect to the grand theft count, the state charged the defendant with first degree grand theft, a second degree felony, alleging that the motor vehicle had a value of $20,000 or more. The appellant contends that it was error to deny his motion to dismiss the charge of grand theft in the first degree. The appellant says that theft of a motor vehicle is a third degree felony under the theft statute and that the state is not at liberty to charge first degree grand theft where the property is a motor vehicle even though the vehicle has a value of $20,000 or more. We do not believe that the legislature intended such a construction of the provisions of the theft statute. A more reasonable construction, and one we adopt, is that the enumeration of certain kinds of property in section (2)(b) of the theft statute is a recognition that stealing certain kinds of property should be treated at least as third degree felonies regardless of the value of such property but that first degree grand theft may be charged where that property has a value of $20,-000 or more. The fact that such a construction imbues the prosecuting authority with the discretion to decide whether to charge theft of a $20,000 motor vehicle as a third degree felony under subsection 2(b) or as a first degree felony under subsection 2(a) is unavailing to the defendant. See Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269 (Fla.1978); State v. Copher, 395 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Cf. State v. Young, 371 So. 2d 1029 (Fla.1979). (emphasis supplied).
We agree with the reasoning of our sister court in Davis and, therefore, adopt its analysis and holding. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the trial court’s order dismissing the three complaints, direct the lower court to reinstate the informations, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
REVERSED, VACATED and REMANDED with instructions.
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Carmelos Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1978)
- State v. Young, 371 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1979)
- State v. Copher, 395 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Ricco v. State, 445 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Granderson Davis, Jr. v. State, 445 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)