ADVANTAGE PERSONNEL AGENCY, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
HICKS & GRAYSON, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Advantage Personnel Agency appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim for slander against Hicks & Grayson, Inc. The Florida appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that statements made to a corporate executive or managerial employee do not constitute publication to a third party, which is essential to a slander claim.
Statements made to a corporate executive or managerial employee, such as a sales manager, at the conclusion of a business conference do not constitute publication to a third party and therefore do not satisfy the essential element of publication required for a slander cause of action.
[1] Publication to a corporate executive or managerial employee of the slandered corporation, such as a sales manager, at the conclusion of a business conference with that em…
[2] A slander action requires the essential element of publication to a third party.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the rule must necessarily be different where, as here, the statements complained of are made to a corporate executive or managerial employee, such as a sales manager, at the conclusion of a business conference with the said employee. In such a case, the statements are, in effect, being made to the management of the corporation and thus to the corporation itself in the person of one of its executive or managerial employees.”
Establishes the core holding that statements to managerial employees are not publication to third parties
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHicks & Grayson, through its corporate president, allegedly made slanderous statements about Advantage Personnel Agency's business practices and bill-…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant Advantage Personnel Agency, Inc. appeals a final order dismissing with prejudice its permissive counter claim for slander. The basis for the dismissal was that the essential element of publication in a slander action, see Burnham v. State, 37 Fla. 327, 329, 20 So. 548, 549 (1896); Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So. 2d 99, 102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), was not alleged in the complaint. We affirm.
The appellant Advantage Personnel Agency, Inc. filed a permissive counterclaim below for slander against the appel-lee Hicks & Grayson, Inc. The counterclaim alleged that Hicks through its corporate president uttered certain slanderous statements concerning the business practices of Advantage in paying its bills. These statements were allegedly made at the conclusion of a business conference with an employee of Advantage. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, it was agreed by both parties that the employee who allegedly heard these statements was Madeline Tighe, the sales manager of Advantage. The trial court in the order under review noted this agreement and, in effect, treated the agreement as an ore tenus amendment to the counterclaim.
Although there may be cases in which a slanderous statement directed against a corporation could be published, as urged, to a lower echelon employee of the slandered corporation, see Diplomat Electric, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 378 F. 2d 377, 381 (5th Cir.1967); W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 113 at 767 (4th ed. 1971), the rule must necessarily be different where, as here, the statements complained of are made to a corporate executive or managerial employee, such as a sales manager, at the conclusion of a business conference with the said employee. In such a case, the statements are, in effect, being made to the management of the corporation and thus to the corporation itself in the person of one of its executive or managerial employees. The corporation has no cause of action for slander under these circumstances as the essential element of publication to a third party is lacking. See Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 F.Supp. 1234 (C.D.Utah 1982).
Affirmed.
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Citator
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Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Geddes, 960 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…ial element of publication. See, e.g., Lopez v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 1997 WL 401585, 10 Fla. L. Weekly D635 (S.D.Fla. Mar 18,1997); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 953 F.Supp. 1334 (M.D.Ala. 1996); Advantage Personnel Agency v. Hicks & Grayson, Inc., 447 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Moreover, one who publishes defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the publication if the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it conditionally privileged and the privilege is not abused. See, e.g. Nod…
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Rand Hoch v. Loren, 273 So. 3d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
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Groome v. Feyh, 651 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Diplomat Elec., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967)
- Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Burnham v. State, 37 Fla. 327 (Fla. 1896)