JANE WINIFRED MCGREGOR, APPELLANT,
v.
BRUCE MCGREGOR, APPELLEE
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Jane McGregor appealed the trial court's dissolution of marriage judgment, challenging the court's decision to set aside a property settlement agreement and deed. The appellate court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence supported the trial judge's findings that the agreement was grossly unfair, impossible to perform, and not freely and voluntarily entered into.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that when considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was adequate legal support for the trial judge's findings that the property settlement agreement and deed should be set aside.
[1] A property settlement agreement in a dissolution of marriage action may be set aside if it is found to be grossly unfair on its face.
[2] A property settlement agreement may be set aside if it is impossible of performance by one of the parties.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The final judgment set aside the agreement upon a finding that the property settlement agreement was grossly unfair on its face, was impossible of performance by the husband, and was not freely and voluntarily entered into by him.”
Establishes the trial court's grounds for invalidating the settlement agreement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe McGregor marriage lasted approximately 23 years and produced two children (ages 19 and 13). The wife, age 44 at trial, had permanent medical probl…
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[*995] DOWNEY, J.
Appellant, Jane Winifred McGregor, seeks reversal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
This marriage endured for approximately 23 years and resulted in the birth of two children, a daughter nineteen and a son thirteen. The wife was 44 years of age at the time of the final hearing and had some permanent medical problems. Since moving to Florida she had not done any appreciable work outside the home. The husband is a carpenter by trade and worked as a building inspector prior to the divorce.
The last several years of this marriage were not blissful. The wife testified the husband said he hated her and the children. The husband testified that she constantly criticized him in front of the children and generally made life miserable for him. According to the husband, she drove him away from the home — he could not stand it any longer. Two weeks later they discussed his returning but she wanted the marital home placed in her name first. He conveyed the property to her but things did not really improve after his return. The husband testified that she kept telling him to leave until finally they decided to get a divorce. He told her to get the cheapest lawyer she could find to represent them both. The wife employed a lawyer who drew an agreement for them in which the wife received all of their property except a 1973 Ford with 90,000 miles on it, his tools, clothes and approximately $600 worth of bank stock.
The final judgment set aside the agreement upon a finding that the property settlement agreement was grossly unfair on its face, was impossible of performance by the husband, and was not freely and voluntarily entered into by him. It also set aside the deed for the marital home for much the same reasons. The judgment then made provision for alimony and child support independent of the provisions of the agreement. It also provided that the wife and child should have exclusive possession of the home for two years after which it should be sold and the proceeds divided after payment to the wife of $10,000 lump sum alimony out of the husband’s one-half.
We have carefully considered the evidence adduced by the parties relative to the issue of the voluntariness of the agreement and evidence and hold that, considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is adequate, legal support for the trial judge’s findings.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BERANEK and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
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Waton v. Waton, 887 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…Hjor-taas, the actual agreement in this case does contain Husband’s financial information. Wife also argues that the agreement was a product of overreaching. See Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); McGregor v. McGregor, [*423] 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). However, we find each of the authorities relied on to be distinguishable. Unlike Tenneboe, this case does not involve a situation where Wife agreed to pay her income to Husband. At the most, this agreement withdraws Husband’s s…
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Ciro Torres v. Alina Lincheta, 744 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ind that, absent any findings by the trial court of imputed income, this agreement is unconscionable as the husband is in failing health and his financial affidavit indicates that his total gross income is $36,000 per year. See McGregor v. McGregor, 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Ellis v. Ellis, 385 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 353 So. 2d 676 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of dissolution of marriage and t…
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Schreiber v. Schreiber, 795 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…rt of that argument, he cites to the cases of Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), Torres v. [*1057] Lincheta, 744 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), Moss-Jacober v. Moss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), and McGregor v. McGregor, 447 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The problem we find with that argument is the lack of competent evidence that the MSA was the product of overreaching on appellee’s part. It definitely was one-sided and unfair. But, that alone, no matter how egregious, does not…
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