UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
RAYMOND G. MENDOZA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

9th Cir. | 1971-04-28
No. 26286
441 F.2d 1107 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (1971) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The court held that the defendant's conviction was valid because Miranda warnings were adequate, any Bruton violation was harmless error, and probable cause for arrest existed.


Facts & Procedural History

Mendoza was convicted of possessing and passing counterfeit currency. He appealed, arguing inadequate Miranda warnings, a Bruton violation, and lack o…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM:

Mendoza appeals from his conviction for possessing and passing three counterfeit ten dollar Federal Reserve notes. 18 U.S.C. § 472. He urges reversal on three grounds.

Mendoza, a Mexican-American, argues that he was not adequately warned of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the warnings were not given in Spanish as well as English. The testimony as to his ability to understand English was in conflict. The issue was one of credibility. The court resolved that issue in favor of the government. There was clearly substantial evidence to support the finding that Mendoza fully understood his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. See Jordan v. United States, 421 F. 2d 493, 496-497 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Valdes, 417 F. 2d 335, 337-338 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. United States v. Trabucco, 424 F. 2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1970).

Mendoza argues that hearsay statements of an alleged accomplice, introduced at the trial for the limited, non-hearsay purpose of demonstrating probable cause for arrest, violated his right of confrontation under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). We assume, but do not decide, that a violation of Bruton occurred. Nevertheless, overwhelming independent evidence of Mendoza’s guilt, including a full confession and positive, in-eourt identification by an eye witness, satisfies us that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Maurice, 416 F. 2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1969); Neal v. United States, 415 F. 2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1969).

Finally, Mendoza argues that there was no probable cause for his arrest because the arresting agent relied on information from an informant of untested reliability. The informant was, by his own admission, an accomplice in the crime. He related the underlying circumstances of the offense to the arresting agent. His story, and his description of Mendoza, were corroborated by information obtained from eye witnesses. Under these circumstances, the agent’s reliance on the informant was justified. See Musgrove v. Eyman, 435 F. 2d 1235 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 1971); United States v. Jiminez Badilla, 434 F. 2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F. 2d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1966).

The judgment is affirmed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited (12 total)

View all 12 cited authorities →

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw