J.K., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-04-10
No. 83-2077
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY and FERGUSON, JJ.
448 So. 2d 71 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for burglary and theft based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The appellate court reversed, finding the circumstantial evidence insufficient because it was consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.


Holding

The adjudication is reversed because the circumstantial evidence was legally insufficient. The evidence, when taken as a whole, was consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence and therefore did not meet the required standard that circumstances must be of conclusive nature and tendency, leading to a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused committed the offense.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

[2] When the state relies on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, when taken together, must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading to a reasonable and moral c…

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Key Quotes

“where the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence”

Establishes the controlling legal standard for circumstantial evidence cases in Florida

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Facts & Procedural History

Two classrooms at Ponce de Leon Junior High School were burglarized on December 6, 1982, and property including an amplifier, hot plate, art supplies,…

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

J.K., a juvenile, appeals from an adjudication of delinquency upon a finding that he was guilty of the charges of burglary and theft. We reverse.

On December 6, 1982, two classrooms of Ponce de Leon Junior High School were burglarized and certain property, an amplifier, hot plate, art supplies, and candles, was stolen. All of the property was later returned to the school by unidentified means. Witnesses testified that they saw appellant carrying boxes marked “candles,” that he was standing in the vicinity near where the amplifier was discovered, and that he allegedly made certain spontaneous statements to the school resource (police) officer which could be interpreted as being incriminating. There was no direct evidence adduced at trial to show that appellant illegally entered the classrooms, removed any of the property, or took part in the return of the property. Appellant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied and this appeal followed.

At trial, both parties stipulated that the evidence against appellant was wholly circumstantial. The supreme court has stated that the standard to be applied is that “[wjhere the only proof of guilt is circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may suggest guilt a conviction cannot be sustained unless the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257 (Fla.1982). In Owen v. State, 432 So. 2d 579 (Fla.2d DCA 1983), the court stated that “when the state relies on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances, when taken together, must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading on the whole to a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no one else committed the offense charged.” Id. at 581 (emphasis in original). See also E.R. v. State, 422 So. 2d 88 (Fla.3d DCA 1982); J.A.L. v. State, 409 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).

In the case at bar, the circumstances taken as a whole are consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The school was selling candles as a fundraising project; appellant, as a student, had every right to be carrying boxes labeled “candles.” The amplifier was found near an area where students await instructions for their physical education classes; appellant was, in fact, awaiting such instructions. The school resource officer could not recol lect whether the allegedly spontaneous in-culpatory statements were made by appellant or a co-defendant. We find the evidence legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt on the crimes charged. The adjudication below is REVERSED.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …arson conviction reversed); Pate v. State, 72 Fla. 97, 72 So. 517 (1916) (state’s evidence deemed insufficient to establish ownership of heifer or to link defendant to the theft and butchering of heifer; larceny conviction reversed); J.K. v. State, 448 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (state’s evidence linking juvenile to a school burglary and theft deemed insufficient; delinquency adjudication based on burglary and theft findings reversed); C.M. v. State, 434 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (state's evidence deeme…
  • J.J. v. State, 463 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …allowed him to use it — rendered the state’s case, which was based solely on the inference provided by Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1983), without any additional circumstances, insufficient as a matter of law to establish guilt. J.K. v. State, 448 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); R.D.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); R.A.L. v. State, 402 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); A.R. v. State, 393 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Reversed.…
  • J.J.H. v. State, 651 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …ourt’s finding that J.J.H. was guilty of armed burglary. See Morse v. State, 604 So. 2d 496, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Cowart v. State, 582 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); In re J.A. v. State, 485 So. 2d 872, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); J.K. v. State, 448 So. 2d 71, 71 (Fla.3d DCA 1984); Walker v. State, 426 So. 2d 1180, 1180-81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); J.A.L. v. State, 409 So. 2d 70, 70-71 (Fla.3d DCA 1982). The state failed to present any other evidence indicating that J.J.H. entered or remained in Simpson’s hom…

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