HAROLD M. HASKEW, APPELLANT,
v.
SANDRA L. HASKEW, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1984-04-11
No. 83-2101
HURLEY and WALDEN, JJ., and NORRIS, WILLIAM A. Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
448 So. 2d 79 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 1 case

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Synopsis

The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a child support order requiring a former husband to pay support until his children reached age 21, holding that under Florida Statutes § 743.07 (effective July 1, 1973), child support obligations terminate when a child reaches the age of majority of 18 rather than 21.


Holding

Child support orders entered after the July 1, 1973 effective date of § 743.07 cannot require parental support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday, absent limited exceptions. Accordingly, the trial court's order requiring support until age 21 was reversed.


Headnotes

[1] Child support orders entered after July 1, 1973, cannot require support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday, absent limited exceptions.

[2] Voluntary child support payments made before a court order does not establish a pre-statutory effective date child support agreement.

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Key Quotes

“Child support orders entered subsequent to the statute's effective date cannot, with limited exceptions, require a parent to provide support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday.”

Establishes the primary rule that governs child support obligations under § 743.07

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Facts & Procedural History

Husband and wife were divorced in December 1972. Although the husband voluntarily made monthly child support payments prior to July 1, 1973, he was no…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to the former wife’s motion, the trial court ordered the former husband to-make child support payments “until each child reaches age 21, or becomes otherwise emancipated.” We reverse.

Section 743.07, Florida Statutes (1973), which lowered the age of majority to eighteen, took effect on July 1, 1973. Child support orders entered subsequent to the statute’s effective date cannot, with limited exceptions, require a parent to provide support beyond a child’s eighteenth birthday. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 430 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); see Jones v. Jones, 421 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Of course, prior to section 743.07’s enactment, child support payments were re--quired until the child reached twenty-one years of age. See Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).

In the case at bar, the husband and wife were divorced in December, 1972. The husband, however, was not ordered to make child support payments until July 6, 1973, five days after the effective date of section 743.07. Prior to entry of the court’s July 6th order, the husband had voluntarily made monthly payments. However, this did not constitute, nor did the trial court find, a pre-July 1st child support agreement between the husband and wife. Cf. Bird v. Bird, 436 So. 2d 981 (Fla.3d DCA 1983); contra Kramer v. Kramer, 26 Md.App. 620, 339 A. 2d 328 (1975). Since the trial court entered its child support order after section 743.07’s effective date, the former husband’s legal obligation to provide child support terminated upon the youngest child attaining majority, i.e., eighteen years of age. Accordingly, the order requiring husband to make payments until each child reaches age twenty-one is reversed.

HURLEY and WALDEN, JJ., and NORRIS, WILLIAM A. Jr., Associate Judge, concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Carter v. Jonalene Carter, 511 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
    …s still attending high school does not make that child dependent within the meaning of section 743.07, Florida Statutes (1985). See Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1984); French v. French, 452 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Haskew v. Haskew, 448 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Klein v. Klein, 413 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Priede v. Priede, 474 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Coalla v. Coalla, 33…

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