STEPHEN WILLIAM GERRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The appellate court affirmed an order for continued involuntary hospitalization of a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity but remanded to strike a directive that prevented the hospital administrator from seeking immediate release. The court found this directive improperly interfered with the executive branch's authority.
Yes, the court exceeded its jurisdiction. The administrator of a state mental hospital has the authority to seek release of an insanity acquittee, and the court's directive usurped the executive branch's authority, violating the separation of powers.
[1] A court exceeds its jurisdiction by ordering a state mental hospital administrator not to file a request for release of an insanity acquittee, as such power rests with th…
[2] An administrator of a state mental hospital, acting under the authority of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, possesses the power to file a report with…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Thus, by mandating in the recommitment order that the administrator “not file an immediate request for the release of STEPHEN WILLIAM GERRY,” the court below usurped the jurisdiction of the DHRS; it acted in derogation of the doctrine of the separation of powers of our state government.”
This quote explains the court's reasoning for finding that the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStephen William Gerry was committed to a state mental hospital in 1978 after being acquitted of murder by reason of insanity. In 1983, the committing …
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HOBSON, Judge.
In 1978 Stephen William Gerry was acquitted of second degree murder by reason of insanity and committed to the custody of the State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (“DHRS”) for involuntary hospitalization because of the likelihood that he would injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty. He appeals a 1983 order in which the committing court determined that he continues to meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization and therefore directed that he be returned to the state mental hospital for further treatment.
We reject Gerry’s main arguments on appeal since they are devoid of merit. However, we accept his final contention that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction by commanding in the recommitment order that the administrator of the state mental hospital “not file an immediate request for the release of STEPHEN WILLIAM GERRY.” An administrator of a state mental hospital acts under the authority of the DHRS, a department of the executive branch. The DHRS is solely responsible for supervising state mental health facilities, programs, and services. Section 394.457(1), Fla.Stat. (1983). Consistent with these duties, an administrator of a state mental hospital is provided with the power to file a report with the committing court “at any time” for the release of an insanity aequittee if the administrator has concluded that the insanity aequittee no longer meets the conditions for continued involuntary hospitalization. Section 916.-15(2), Fla.Stat. (1983). Thus, by mandating in the recommitment order that the administrator “not file an immediate request for the release of STEPHEN WILLIAM GERRY,” the court below usurped the jurisdiction of the DHRS; it acted in derogation of the doctrine of the separation of powers of our state government. See State ex rel. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla.3d DCA 1974).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of re-commitment but remand with the instruction that the court strike from the order the above-quoted directive.
AFFIRMED and. REMANDED.
OTT, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
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Adm'r, Retreat Hosp. v. The Honorable W. Clayton Johnson of the Cir. Court of the Seventeenth Jud. Cir. In & For Broward Cnty., 660 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…ther the legislature or in the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services because the legislature specifically vested the trial court with the authority to conduct a judicial inquiry when it enacted section 394.459(10). Compare Gerry v. State, 448 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). As we made clear in State v. Schreiber, 561 So. 2d 1236, 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), juris, accepted, 573 So. 2d 3 (Fla.), review denied, 581 So. 2d 1310 (Fla.1991), section 394.459(10) does not give the trial court a separate gra…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Sepe, 291 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Gerry v. State, 394 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)