U. ROLANDE BROWN, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERTA DI PETTA, APPELLEE
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In this interpleader action, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Di Petta, holding that a life insurance policy's beneficiary cannot be changed without strict compliance with the procedures specified in the policy. The appellant's mere intent to change the beneficiary was legally insufficient without formal designation on the insurer's required form.
A beneficiary under a life insurance policy may be changed only by strict compliance with the conditions set forth in the policy. The decedent's mere intent to change the beneficiary was legally insufficient absent an effective designation on the form required by the insurer, and the insurance company did not waive its binding contract provisions by filing an interpleader action.
[1] A beneficiary under a life insurance policy may be changed only by strict compliance with the conditions set forth in the policy.
[2] A mere intent to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is legally insufficient without an effective designation of beneficiary on the form required by the ins…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a beneficiary under a life insurance policy may be changed only by strict compliance with the conditions set forth in the policy”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle governing beneficiary changes in life insurance policies
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe insurance company brought an interpleader action to determine the proper beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The decedent allegedly intended t…
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BASKIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Roberta Di Petta, one of the claimants in an interpleader action brought by the insurance company seeking designation of the proper beneficiary. Based upon our review of the record disclosing that the decedent failed to comply with procedures of the insurance company required to effectuate a change of beneficiary, we affirm. It is a well-settled rule of law that a beneficiary under a life insurance policy may be changed only by strict compliance with the conditions set forth in the policy. Gerstel v. Arens, 143 Fla. 20, 196 So. 616 (1940); Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 138 Fla. 443, 189 So. 412 (1939); Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 841 (1911).
We conclude that the decedent’s mere intent to change the beneficiary of the policy was legally insufficient absent an effective designation of beneficiary on the form required by the insurer. See Garner v. Bemis, 81 Fla. 60, 87 So. 426 (1921).
Furthermore, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that because the insurance company filed an interpleader action, it waived its requirements for effectuating a change of beneficiary. Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) is inapposite. In that case the court found that the decedent had made a lifetime gift of his insurance policy; because he was divested of the incidents of ownership, his subsequent attempt to change the beneficiary was ineffective, regardless of the terms of the policy. Here, however, the decedent retained ownership of the policy during his lifetime and was thus subject to “the provisions for change of beneficiary established by the contract ... [and] binding on the parties.” Id. at 480.
The insurance company did not waive its binding contract provisions by filing an interpleader action.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Vazquez Calderon v. Vazquez, 251 So. 3d 303 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
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Orestes A. Martinez and Bertha M. Martinez v. Lilia M. Saez, 650 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…signated contingent beneficiaries. . This court's decision in Shuster goes on to say that “strict compliance with the terms of the policy is required in order to effect such change.” 351 So. 2d at 64 (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Di Petta, 448 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The rule of strict compliance is subject to the qualification that: [a] provision providing for change of beneficiary in such [life insurance] policy is always within [the insurer’s] control, when made so by contract; to be stri…
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O'Brien v. Cynthia T. McMAHON for Madison Anne Todd, 44 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…s that Prudential itself could not have asserted (if it had been so inclined) when she argues “that a beneficiary under a life insurance policy may be changed only by strict compliance with the conditions set forth in the policy.” Brown v. Di Petta, 448 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (citing Gerstel v. Arens, 143 Fla. 20, 196 So. 616 (1940); Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 138 Fla. 443, 189 So. 412 (1939); Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735, 55 So. 841 (1911)).7 Yet Prudential does not make this argum…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Garner v. Harriett Kraeer Bemis, 81 Fla. 60 (Fla. 1921)
- Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- Howell R. Warren v. The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 138 Fla. 443 (Fla. 1939)
- Cleavey P. Sheppard v. Crowley, 61 Fla. 735 (Fla. 1911)
- L. M. Gerstel in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Mabel A. Hamlyn v. C. H. Arens with will annexed of the estate of Carl P. Haubeil, 143 Fla. 20 (Fla. 1940)