RONNIE NEAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-04-13
No. 83-2172
GRIMES, A.C.J., and RYDER and DAN-AHY, JJ., concur.
448 So. 2d 597 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.


Holding

The assessment of costs against an indigent defendant is improper without prior notice and an opportunity to object.


Facts & Procedural History

Appellant, an indigent defendant, was ordered to pay costs under two Florida Statutes. He argues this assessment was improper because he received no n…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Ronnie Neal appeals from his judgment and sentence for involuntary sexual battery.

In the judgment, appellant was ordered to pay $10.00 pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1981) (Crimes Compensation Trust Fund), and $2.00 pursuant to section 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1981) (Law Enforcement Training and Corree- tional Officer Training Trust Fund). Because he is an indigent, appellant argues that the portion of the trial court’s order assessing such costs is improper. In Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984), the supreme court determined that the assessment of costs under sections 960.20 and 943.25(4) against an indigent defendant is permissible only after the defendant has been given adequate notice of such assessment and full opportunity to object to the assessment. Where no prior notice has been given, this court has stricken the assessment of such costs. Kerney v. State, 445 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Here, nothing in the record indicates that the appellant was given notice and an opportunity to object to the assessment of costs under sections 960.20 and 943.25(4).

Accordingly, the assessment was not appropriate and is hereby stricken. Our decision is without prejudice to the state to tax these costs in accordance with the procedure outlined in Jenkins.

In all other respects, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and RYDER and DAN-AHY, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw