LAZRO QUINONES, FAUSTO PEDRO ASTUDILLO, ANGEL RAFAEL VERDECIA AND FELIPE GONZALEZ, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-04-17
No. 83-1009
Per Curiam
448 So. 2d 608 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Caution
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

Trial court erred in sentencing defendants by believing it lacked discretion to impose a sentence more lenient than the state recommended under Florida's substantial assistance statute, and the case is remanded for resentencing with full exercise of judicial discretion.


Holding

A trial court has discretionary authority to rule on a state's motion to reduce sentence based on defendant's substantial assistance and is not bound by the state's recommendation.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has discretionary authority to impose a sentence more lenient than recommended by the state under a substantial assistance statute and is not bound by the s…

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Key Quotes

“a trial court has discretionary authority to rule on the state's motion to reduce sentence based on the defendant's substantial assistance to the state pursuant to Section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and is not bound by the state's recommendation as to what sentence should be imposed on the defendant”

Court's holding regarding trial court discretion in substantial assistance sentencing

Facts & Procedural History

Four defendants received sentences of five years imprisonment following the trial court's ruling on the state's motion to reduce sentence based on the…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The sentences which are under review by this appeal are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing upon a holding that: (1) a trial court has discretionary authority to rule on the state’s motion to reduce sen tence based on the defendant’s substantial assistance to the state pursuant to Section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and is not bound by the state’s recommendation as to what sentence should be imposed on the defendant, State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514, 519 (Fla.1981); Cherry v. State, 439 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); (2) the trial court did not fully exercise its discretionary authority in ruling on the state’s motion to reduce sentence under Section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (1981), as it (a) erroneously concluded that it had no legal authority to sentence the defendants to a more lenient sentence than that recommended by the state, (b) did not consider imposing such a sentence for supposed lack of legal authority to do so, and (c) thereupon sentenced the defendants to five years imprisonment in accord with the state’s recommendation, see Berezovsky v. State, 350 So. 2d 80 (Fla.1977); (3) the trial court upon remand should exercise its full discretionary authority when ruling on the state’s motion to reduce sentence, under Section 893.135(3), Florida Statutes (1981), taking into consideration (a) the state’s recommendation thereon without in any way being bound thereby, and (b) any pre-sentence investigation report which may be called for in this case. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.710.

Reversed and remanded.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • DOE v. State, 499 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
    …ive-year mandatory minimum sentence, erroneously believing that the statute prohibited further reduction; however, the trial court had the discretion to reduce the sentence further and was not bound by the state’s recommendations. Quinones v. State, 448 So. 2d 608 (Fla.3d DCA 1984); see State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514 (Fla.1981); Cherry v. State, 439 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). We therefore remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing. Reversed and remanded.…
  • Nunzio Michael Fazio v. Russell Bldg. Movers, Inc., 469 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …, as here, to adopt a set policy of denying all such motions. A trial court is always required to exercise the discretion afforded it and since that discretion was not exercised in this case, the judgment must be reversed. Compare Quinones v. State, 448 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The final judgment under review is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to exercise its discretion in ruling on the plaintiffs motion for new trial. If the said motion is denied, the final judgme…
  • Williams v. Fla. Mem'l Coll., 453 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …n remand, the trial court is directed to exercise its discretion and rule on the merits as to the professor’s request for attorney’s fees relating solely to legal services performed in prevailing on count III of the complaint. See Quinones v. State, 448 So. 2d 608, 609 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Symon v. J. Rolfe Davis, Inc., 245 So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 249 So. 2d 36 (Fla.1971); Childs v. Catlin, 134 Ga.App. 778, 216 S.…

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