RICHARD A. SHAW, APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA L. SHAW, APPELLEE
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Richard Shaw appealed the denial of his petition to modify alimony payments under a property settlement agreement with his former wife Barbara Shaw. The court affirmed, holding that support payments made as consideration for relinquishment of valuable property rights are non-modifiable under Florida law.
The court held that the support payments were non-modifiable because they constituted consideration for the wife's relinquishment of valuable property rights and were part of a true property settlement agreement, not separate alimony. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the husband's modification petition.
[1] Alimony or support payments made as consideration for the relinquishment of valuable property rights are not subject to modification.
[2] A property settlement agreement is considered non-modifiable when parties exchange valuable property rights as consideration.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Support or alimony payments made as consideration for the relinquishment of valuable property rights cannot be modified.”
Establishes the core legal principle that support payments exchanged for property rights are non-modifiable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties executed a property settlement agreement in which the wife conveyed her interest in jointly held property and relinquished claims against …
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HURLEY, Judge.
The former husband appeals from an order denying his petition for modification of “alimony” payments. The trial court found that the payments were due under a non-modifiable property settlement agreement. Alternatively, the trial court held that even if the agreement were legally subject to modification, the husband was not entitled to modification under section 61.14(1), Florida Statutes (1983), because he failed to make a sufficient showing of changed financial circumstances. We find it unnecessary to review the sufficiency of the husband’s evidence in support of modification because we agree that the property settlement agreement is non-modifiable. Therefore, we affirm.
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the wife agreed to convey to the husband her interest in jointly held property and to relinquish claims against property in the husband’s name. The husband, in turn, promised to convey to the wife his interest in various pieces of real estate, as well as a 1971 Cadillac automobile. The agreement further provides that “[t]he wife, for and in exchange of the conveyances to her by the husband as aforesaid, agrees to relinquish, release any claim for alimony or support over that specifically provided in Paragraph 2.” Under paragraph 2, the husband promised to pay the wife a lump sum of $20,000.00 plus $1,600.00 per month until the wife dies or remarries. The monthly payments were to survive the death of the husband and be a claim against his estate under the specific terms of the contract.
The husband eventually sought modification of the term providing for monthly support payments, arguing that he had suffered a financial setback such that his assets decreased from a value of $547,710.05 at the time the agreement was executed, to a value of $367,638.00, of which no part are liquid; at the same time, the value of the wife’s assets increased substantially. The wife counterclaimed for arrearages of support payments and specific performance of the agreement.
We think the trial court correctly denied the request for modification under section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1983), because the contract was a true property settlement agreement not subject to modification. See Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So. 2d 111 (Fla.1967).
Support or alimony payments made as consideration for the relinquishment of valuable property rights cannot be modified. See Karch v. Karch, 445 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Mills v. Mills, 339 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); cf. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 424 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228, 229 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
But see Hogshead v. Hogshead, 444 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Here, the wife bargained away her interest in the husband’s property as well as jointly held properties in return for ownership of various pieces of real estate, an automobile, and a lump sum of $20,000 plus support payments of $1,600 per month for life. The parties were clearly bargaining for the exchange of valuable property rights under this agreement, and its terms are therefore not subject to modification.
Accordingly, we affirm.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WALDEN, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Fecteau v. Se. Bank, N.A., 585 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…f the children under the agreement. Therefore, while appellees are correct that a marital home often is awarded as an incident of support, that clearly is not what happened here. True property settlement agreements cannot be modified. Shaw v. Shaw, 448 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Appel-lees argue that paragraph four had to be a support obligation because it specifically provided that the arrangement could be modified. This is simply incorrect. Paragraph four actually states that Fecteau’s right can be cu…
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Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…agreement is plainly not a "true" property settlement agreement which would be non-modifiable on that basis. E.g., Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 424 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); compare, [*1209] Shaw v. Shaw, 448 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and cases cited.…
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Boyd v. Boyd, 478 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…982). (b) Considering the agreement as a whole, it is clear that the payments were not limited as a bargained for condition of a mutual exchange of property rights or obligations between the parties as in, for example, Salomon, Karch, Shaw v. Shaw, 448 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and [*358] Pruitt v. Pruitt, 370 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Rather, the provision is simply one which involves a discharge, on an agreed basis, of the husband’s obligation for his wife’s support. Hence, it cannot be regarded…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1967)
- Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Wolfe v. Wolfe, 424 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Mills v. Mills, 339 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Brisco v. Brisco, 355 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Karch v. Karch, 445 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Hogshead v. Hogshead, 444 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)