COLUMBUS BRIDGES AND ALMA P. BRIDGES, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
CARLTON WILLIAMSON, ROBERT LEE KITCHEN, WILLIE POUNSEL, JAMES COWART, LAWRENCE POINDEXTER AND AL BRIDGES, APPELLEES
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Florida's statutory notice requirement for defamation actions does not apply to nonmedia defendants, even if their statements are republished by the media.
[1] A nonfinal order that affords a party an opportunity to amend their complaint is generally not appealable, but may be reviewed by writ of certiorari.
[2] Certiorari is available to review a nonfinal order that does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may cause irreparable injury not remediable on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants sued appellees for defamation. Appellees moved to dismiss, citing failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 770.01, Florida …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants seek review of the trial court’s nonfinal order dismissing their complaint with leave to amend. We reverse.
Appellants, Columbus Bridges and Alma P. Bridges, his wife, filed a complaint in the trial court seeking compensatory and punitive damages for alleged defamatory statements made by appellees, Carlton Williams, Robert Lee Kitchen, Willie Pounsel, James Cowart, Lawrence Poindexter, and A1 Bridges. Some of the statements allegedly made by appellees were republished in a newspaper. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because appellants failed to comply with section 770.01, Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court granted the motion but allowed appellants twenty days to amend their complaint to allege compliance with section 770.01. Appellants then filed an appeal of the trial court’s nonfinal order. The order under review is a non-appealable nonfinal order because it afforded an opportunity for appellants to amend their complaint. This appeal is properly before us, however, because we have discretion to treat an improperly filed appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 815, 102 S.Ct. 92, 70 L.Ed.2d 84 (1981). Certiorari is available when the order under review does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause irreparable injury which cannot be remedied on appeal. Briggs. We grant certiorari in this case because compliance with the trial court order might result in republication of a libelous statement that could irreparably injure appellants. See § 770.02, Fla.Stat. (1981).
We hold chapter 770, Florida Statutes (1981), does not apply to nonmedia defendants even when alleged defamatory statements made by a nonmedia defendant are republished by the media. Therefore, we find the trial court erred in requiring appellant to comply with section 770.01.
Section 770.01, Florida Statutes (1981), provides as follows:
Notice condition precedent to action or prosecution for libel or slander. — Before any civil action is brought for publication or broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical, or other medium, of a libel or slander, the plaintiff shall, at least 5 days before instituting such action, serve notice in writing on the defendant, specifying the article or broadcast and the statements therein which he alleges to be false and defamatory.
The statute requires a plaintiff to serve notice on a defendant five days prior to instituting a civil action for libel or slander. This provision has been construed to apply exclusively to suits against newspapers and periodicals, as distinguished from private individuals. Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla.1950). In Ross, the supreme court recognized that one of the objectives of the statute was to afford newspapers and periodicals an opportunity to make full retraction in order to correct inadvertent errors and mitigate damages, as well as to save them the expense of answering to an unfounded suit for libel.
After Ross, the statute was amended to include civil actions for slander against broadcasting stations. Ch. 76-123, Laws of Fla. (1976) (codified as amended at § 770.01, Fla.Stat. (1983)). At that time, the legislature was aware of Ross since it is presumed to be cognizant of the judicial construction of a statute when contemplating changes in the statute. See Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla.1981). Had the legislature intended to extend the application of the statute to nonmedia defendants, it could have inserted such a provision into the statute at that time. See Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1977).
Appellees contend that, rather than follow the rationale in Ross, this court should defer to the federal court’s decision in Laney v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 910 (S.D.Fla.1982). We disagree. The rules of stare decisis do not require this court to follow federal court decisions that construe Florida’s substantive law. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Although the federal court in Laney extended the application of section 770.01 to include nonmedia defendants, we believe the legislature did not intend such an extension. The language of the statute is limited to newspapers, periodicals, and other media. Nowhere does the statute contain the words “nonmedia” or “private individuals.” 1
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, quash the order dismissing appellants’ complaint, and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.
DANAHY, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . See Staff Analysis of Senate Judiciary-Civil Comm., 1976 Legis., 1st Sess., Libel, Slander and Invasion of Privacy by Publication or Broadcast (1976) (staff analysis by S. Kubik).
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Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1987)…bly cause material injury of an irreparable nature. Illustrative is “cat out of the bag” material that could be used by an unscrupulous litigant to injure another person or party outside the context of the litigation. See e.g. Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (irreparable injury due to possible republication of libelous statement); City of Miami Beach v. Town, 375 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (question concerning ongoing police investigation may compromise the investigation as well as…
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Mancini v. Personalized AIR Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…Dawson, 444 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). If section 770.01 applies, defendant is entitled to certio-rari relief from the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the complaint for the failure to meet this pre-suit requirement. See Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see generally Citron v. Shell, 689 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Section 770.01, the notice provision, and section 770.02, the retraction provision, grant valuable rights by allowing certain defendants in defamation actions t…1 / 2
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State v. Rhodes, 554 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…cause the proper vehicle to request review on such grounds is a common-law writ of certiorari, Hudson v. Hofmann, 471 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), we treat this appeal as a petition for certiorari. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c); Bridges v. Williamson, 449 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). We grant the writ, quash the order of mitigation, and remand with instructions that the trial court reinstate the original sentence. Reversed and remanded. SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 17 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938)
- Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950)
- Rushing v. Jacksonville Elec. Auth., 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
- Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1981)
- Briggs v. Salcines, 392 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Renaldo Reino, Sr. v. The State of Fla. & the Honorable Gerald T. Wetherington, 352 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1977)
- Blum v. Yaretsky, 454 U.S. 815 (U.S. 1981)
- Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. United States, 454 U.S. 815 (U.S. 1981)
- Laney v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 910 (S.D. Fla. 1982)