TANYA JEAN FAIRCLOTH, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER EUGENE FAIRCLOTH, JR., APPELLEE
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Wife appeals termination of rehabilitative alimony awarded in her divorce. The court affirms the trial judge's decision to terminate the alimony based on the wife's remarriage and changed circumstances, rejecting her argument that the lump-sum structure meant it should be classified as lump-sum alimony rather than rehabilitative alimony.
The trial court properly characterized the award as rehabilitative alimony despite its lump-sum payment structure, and properly terminated it based on the wife's remarriage and elimination of need for further rehabilitative alimony. The purpose and intent of the award, not its form, determines its character.
[1] The purpose of an alimony award, not its form, determines whether it is rehabilitative or lump sum alimony.
[2] A trial court has discretion to determine how alimony payments will be made, including in a lump sum paid in installments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The purpose of the award, not the form, determines its character.”
Establishes that classifying alimony as rehabilitative versus lump-sum depends on the trial court's intent and purpose, not the payment structure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a divorce final judgment, the husband was ordered to pay the wife $4,000 in rehabilitative alimony at $200 per month. The trial court later termina…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant appeals from an order of the trial court terminating rehabilitative alimony. The alimony provision in the final judgment, which the court below terminated, provided that the husband “shall pay to the wife for rehabilitative alimony the sum of $4,000 to be páid at the rate of $200 per month.”
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in the final judgment by calling the lump sum award “rehabilitative alimony” rather than “lump sum alimony” for the purposes of equitable distribution. Even if we could, on this appeal, reach the final judgment provision, we would disagree with appellant. Even so, we conclude the trial judge acted properly in terminating the alimony and, therefore, we affirm.
Pursuant to section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court had discretion to choose between the two types of alimony.
The testimony considered at trial and the language of the final judgment indicate that the trial judge deliberately chose the rehabilitative type of alimony. The lump sum nature of the award does not indicate that the lower court erroneously characterized the award as rehabilitative alimony. The purpose of the award, not the form, determines its character. See McCay v. McCay, 413 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The trial court has discretion to determine how the payments will be made. § 61.08, Fla.Stat. (1981). Further, in regard to rehabilitative alimony, a lump sum award paid in installments has the same effect as an award of a fixed amount for a fixed period of time. (For example, a lump sum award of $4,800 in rehabilitative alimony, to be paid at the rate of $200 per month, has the same effect as $200 per month in rehabilitative alimony to be paid for two years.)
Appellant next claims that termination of her rehabilitative alimony, based upon her remarriage, was erroneous, citing Frye v. Frye, 385 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
While Frye states that rehabilitative alimony does not automatically terminate upon remarriage, it does not prohibit a trial judge from finding that remarriage or other changed circumstances of the recipient spouse has eliminated or altered the need for further rehabilitative alimony. Here, the trial judge properly made such a determination. The recipient spouse has remarried and obtained employment through the family business of her new spouse. She is no longer in the training position she had at the time of the final judgment, and she is making no attempt to improve her job skills aside from the job at the family business. Appellant has made no showing of her continuing need for rehabilitative alimony.
Therefore, we find that the trial court properly terminated the award of rehabilitative alimony.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm.
SCHOONOVER and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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Akers v. Akers, 518 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)…Statutes (1985) does provide that rehabilitative alimony may be awarded in lump sum payments, the cases addressing lump sum rehabilitative awards specifically refer to the lump sum award as being payable over time. See, e.g., Faircloth v. Faircloth, 449 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) and O’Brien v. O’Brien, 423 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Here, the trial court improperly permitted the former husband, at his option, to divest the former wife of her right to seek future modification of the award. Rehabilita…
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Owens v. Owens, 559 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…’s economic circumstances or those of the newly acquired spouse is peculiarly within his or her knowledge and may not be readily available to the payor spouse. Frye v. Frye, 385 So. 2d 1383, 1390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). See also Faircloth v. Faircloth, 449 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Maas v. Maas, 438 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The Fifth District has aligned itself with the Second. Markham v. Markham, 485 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Schneider v. Schneider, 467 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Bentzon…1 / 2
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Winkles v. Winkles, 566 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…385 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Nevertheless, we have held that a trial court may properly consider remarriage as a circumstance which can, but does not necessarily, eliminate the need for further rehabilitative alimony. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 449 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Therefore, we strike the impermissible clause from the final judgment and affirm in all other respects. Affirmed as modified. LEHAN and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Frye v. Frye, 385 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- McCAY v. McCAY, 413 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)