LORENZO TEAGUE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Lorenzo Teague appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss a grand theft charge arising from a police decoy operation. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss but reversed the assessment of attorney's fees and costs against the indigent defendant due to lack of required notice and hearing.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss, finding no reversible error. However, the court reversed the assessment of attorney's fees and costs because the record was silent as to whether the notice and hearing required by Florida law were afforded to Teague before such assessments were imposed.
[1] A police officer's use of a decoy to solicit the commission of a crime does not, as a matter of law, constitute entrapment.
[2] A motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) is properly denied when the facts alleged in the motion do not establish a legal defense to the c…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Attorney's fees and costs can properly be recovered from an insolvent defendant.”
Establishes the general rule that indigent defendants may be assessed such costs
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA police officer posing as a homeless or downtrodden person stood on a Tampa street with money protruding from his pocket. Teague removed the money an…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Public Defender Appointment cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Judge.
In Teague, we have before us almost a carbon copy of State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and Goldstein v. State, 435 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The scenario is the same: a police officer-decoy pretending to be a wino or some other downtrodden, ill person was on the streets of Tampa with money protruding from his pocket. Teague removed the money and was immediately arrested by detectives posted nearby. He was charged with grand theft in the second degree in violation of section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981).
After the trial judge denied his motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), Teague entered a nolo contendere but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The court below accepted the plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Teague on probation for a period of three years.
Upon review of the record, we find no reversible error and affirm the trial court’s order relating to the motion to dismiss and probation, see Goldstein and Cruz; contra, State v. Casper, 417 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), but have concern in regard to other orders entered herein by the court below.
Upon responding to the charging document, Teague was found by the trial judge to be insolvent and the public defender was appointed counsel.
Subsequent to the nolo plea and the placing of Teague on probation, the trial court orally assessed court costs against Teague in the amount of $100.00. However, in a written probation order, the trial judge ordered, inter alia, Teague to pay the public defender’s fee and “make $100.00 court costs.” In a final judgment assessing attorney’s fees and costs, Teague was ordered to pay $250.00 for attorney’s fees and $50.00 costs.
Attorney’s fees and costs can properly be recovered from an insolvent defendant. Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). The record before us is silent as to whether notice and a hearing required by section 27.56(7), Florida Statutes (1981), were afforded Teague. Accordingly, the assessments were not appropriate and are hereby stricken. Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla.1984). Gaylord v. State, 413 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Our decision is without prejudice to the state to tax these costs in accordance with the procedure outlined in Jenkins.
In all other respects, the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Teague v. State, 472 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1985)…ADKINS, Justice. We have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Teague v. State, 449 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), which expressly and . directly conflicts with State v. Casper, 417 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 418 So. 2d 1280 (Fla.1982). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. Our decision…
Authorities Cited
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Casper, 417 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- State v. Cruz, 426 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Gaylord v. State, 413 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Zdenka Slomovic v. McLOON, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Anderson v. State, 415 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Goldstein v. State, 435 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)