WILLIAM WILSON AND BARBARA WILSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
FLORIDA AIRLINES, INC., A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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The Wilsons appealed a judgment in favor of Florida Airlines after Mr. Wilson was injured by slipping on hydraulic fluid at an airport gate. The court held that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a jury instruction that violation of a county airport safety ordinance constituted negligence per se, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The trial court erred in refusing the negligence per se instruction. Wilson was a member of the class of persons the ordinance was designed to protect, and his injury was the type the ordinance was designed to prevent. Therefore, the jury should have been instructed that violation of the county fire and safety ordinance constituted negligence per se.
[1] A violation of a county ordinance designed to protect a particular class of persons from a specific type of harm constitutes negligence per se if the injured party is wit…
[2] A party is entitled to a jury instruction on their theory of the case, even if the opposing party presents evidence controverting that theory.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a standard jury instruction charging that a violation of a county ordinance was negligence per se. We hold such refusal was error.”
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Wilson, a National Airlines employee, slipped and fell on what appeared to be hydraulic fluid in the Gate 3 ramp area of Fort Myers Airport on…
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SCHEB, Judge.
The Wilsons challenge a final judgment in favor of Florida Airlines, Inc., in their negligence action for injuries to Mr. Wilson.
The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in refusing to give a standard jury instruction charging that a violation of a county ordinance was negligence per se. We hold such refusal was error. While working in the Gate 3 ramp area of the Fort Myers Airport on July 25, 1979, William Wilson, a National Airlines (National) employee, slipped and fell in what appeared to be a puddle of hydraulic fluid. Wilson was helping to unload a recently landed National flight when the accident occurred. National and Florida Airlines were the only airlines that used Gate 3 on the day of the accident. Wilson and his wife subsequently sued Florida Airlines, alleging that one of its flights had negligently left the fluid on the ramp. They claimed that Florida Airlines negligently failed to inspect and maintain the ramp before departing and failed to warn others of the hazardous condition it had created.
Prior to trial, the court took judicial notice of a county ordinance requiring that all persons using the airport “exercise the utmost care to guard against fire and injury to persons or property.” Lee County, Florida, Ordinance 76-4 (March 31, 1976). The ordinance further stated that “[a]ll persons occupying space at the airport shall keep the space allotted to them policed and free from rubbish and accumulation of any material ... and all floors shall be kept clean and free from fuel or oil.” Id. While the parties presented conflicting testimony concerning the origin of the puddle of fluid, the evidence at trial did show that Florida Airlines regularly used Gate 3 and had landed a flight there just before Mr. Wilson’s accident occurred.
During the jury instruction conference at trial, the Wilsons submitted a written instruction, pursuant to Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Civil) 4.9, charging that violation of the above ordinance was negligence per se. The trial court refused to give this instruction, and the Wilsons objected. As noted, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Florida Airlines.
The Wilsons correctly point out that they were entitled to a jury instruction on their theory of the case even though Florida Airlines offered evidence controverting that theory. Luster v. Moore, 78 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.1955); White v. Burger King Corp., 433 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); City of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). A crucial element of their theory was that a violation of a county fire and safety ordinance, which protects a particular class of persons, is negligence per se. Concord Florida, Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242, 246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 946 (Fla.1977). See also de Jesus v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla.1973).
We hold that Wilson is a member of the class of persons which this ordinance is designed to protect, and his injury is of the type the ordinance is designed to prevent. Thus, we reject Florida Airlines’ argument that the court was precluded from instructing on a negligence per se theory, because the ordinance was designed to protect the general public. Concord Florida, Inc., 341 So. 2d at 246. Therefore, the trial court should have instructed the jury that a violation of this county fire and safety ordinance was negligence per se. Id.
Finally, we note that such a violation itself does not mean that actionable negligence exists. Mr. Wilson must also establish that the violation of the ordinance was the proximate cause of his injury. See de Jesus, 281 So. 2d at 201.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
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Laverine Thursby and Wynell Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…s concerning express warranty unavailing. Litigants are, of course, entitled to have instructions reflecting their theory of the case submitted to the jury where evidence exists in the record to support the theory, Wilson v. Florida Airlines, Inc., 449 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Morganstine v. Rosomoff, 407 So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Furthermore, in cases such as this, involving the alleged breach of an express warranty, the failure to give the proper requested instructions has been held reversi…
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Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Clark, 491 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…instructions on their theory of the case, even when the defendant offers evidence controverting that theory, where the evidence substantially supports the plaintiffs’ theory. Luster v. Moore, 78 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla.1955); Wilson v. Florida Airlines, 449 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984); White v. Burger King Corp., 433 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); City of Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889, 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Further, Florida courts have upheld instructions whic…
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Harnly v. Watson, 519 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…76), and where a party’s theory of the case is supported by competent evidence and he properly requests an instruction on that theory, he is entitled to such an instruction. Luster v. Moore, 78 So. 2d 87 (Fla.1955); Wilson v. Florida Airlines, Inc., 449 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1984). In order to determine whether the giving or refusing to give an instruction is error, we must consider the pleadings, the evidence, and the other instructions of the court. Stewa…
Authorities Cited
- In re Transition Rule 15, 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973)
- Luster v. Moore, 78 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1955)
- The Concord Fla., Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Leiser v. State, 398 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- City OF Tamarac v. Garchar, 398 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- White v. Burger King Corp., 433 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)