T.L.J., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the state cannot rely on the presumption afforded by section 810.07, Florida Statutes, when charging a defendant with intending to commit a specific offense, due to insufficient evidence of that intent.
Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for burglary with intent to commit theft. The appellate court found insufficient evidence that the appellant inte…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a petition charging burglary with intent to commit theft. We reverse upon the authority of Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), because there was insufficient evidence to prove that appellant intended to steal anything when he entered the house trailer. Since the state charged appellant with intending to commit a specific offense, it may not rely upon the presumption afforded by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981).
Our decision conflicts with L.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), in which the court said:
If the state were precluded from using the presumption by virtue of charging the intent to commit a specific offense, there would bé no incentive for the state to ever enumerate the particular offense. We hold, therefore, that when the state charges that the defendant did intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07.
We appreciate the concern expressed by our sister court. It further appears that by seeking a bill of particulars, a defendant may be able to circumvent section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), even when the state does not allege the intent to commit a specific offense. Nevertheless, our interpretation of State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla.1983), compels us to reaffirm the conclusion we reached in Bennett.
REVERSED.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Frederick v. State, 451 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…1067] tive intent statute, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981),1 when it has charged an intent to commit a specific offense. The Second District has held that the state, under such circumstances, may not rely on the presumption. T.L.J. v. State, 449 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The Third District takes the opposite position, based upon the following rationale: If the state were precluded from using the presumption by virtue of charging the intent to…
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Frederick v. State, 459 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed on the authority of Frederick v. State, 451 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). But see T.L.J. v. State, 449 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) with which this decision is in conflict. AFFIRMED. COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH and CO-WART, JJ., concur.…
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State v. T.L.J., 464 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1985)…ADKINS, Justice. The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, T.L.J. v. State, 449 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of other district courts of appeal. We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We quash the decision on the authority of L.S. v. State, 464 So. 2…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983)
- Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- L.S. v. State, 446 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)