KEVIN JOHN MARQUEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kevin Marquez was convicted of escape from jail while awaiting sentencing on three prior offenses. The appellate court reversed because the state improperly introduced prejudicial testimony about the nature and circumstances of Marquez's initial arrests, which was unnecessary to prove his lawful custody status.
The court reversed Marquez's conviction because the state's introduction of testimony detailing the nature of his arrest and the probable cause factors was prejudicial and unnecessary. Under the presumption of lawful custody established in State v. Williams, the state need only prove confinement in a penal institution; the accused's original arrest need not be proved technically correct, and introduction of such proof prejudices the accused.
[1] Evidence of the nature of underlying offenses and the probable cause for arrest is inadmissible in a prosecution for escape, as it is unduly prejudicial.
[2] In a prosecution for escape, the state need not prove the technical correctness of a prisoner's original arrest; the unlawfulness of confinement is an affirmative defense…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a presumption of lawful custody exists when the state proves that an accused was confined in any of the penal institutions described in section 944.40”
Establishes that the state need only prove confinement, not the lawfulness of the original arrest
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarquez allegedly escaped from Lee County jail while awaiting sentencing on three convicted offenses. At trial on the escape charge, the state called …
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BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant challenges his conviction and sentence for escape under section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1981), on three grounds; we reverse on the basis of the sole point which we consider to have merit.
Appellant allegedly escaped from the Lee County jail while awaiting sentencing on three convicted offenses. During the jury trial on the escape charge, the state attempted to establish appellant’s status as a prisoner under section 944.40 by showing that he had been lawfully arrested, incarcerated, brought to trial, convicted, and held without bond pending sentencing on the three convicted offenses. Consistent with this line of proof, Lt. Thomas J. Wallace of the Lee County Sheriff’s Department testified over defense counsel’s objection concerning the circumstances surrounding appellant’s arrest on the three initial charges. Wallace’s testimony not only disclosed the nature of the three offenses, but also outlined the factors establishing probable cause for appellant’s arrest. Specifically, Lt. Wallace revealed that he arrested appellant after an apprehended suspect identified appellant as the “mastermind” of the various offenses. We believe that this prejudicial testimony necessitates a new trial.
The supreme court held in State v. Williams, 444 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla.1984), that a presumption of lawful custody exists when the state proves that an accused was confined in any of the penal institutions described in section 944.40. Thus, the unlawfulness of the confinement constitutes an affirmative defense to be raised by the accused, and the state is not required to prove the technical correctness of the prisoner’s original arrest. Indeed, as the supreme court recognized in Williams, the accused undoubtedly would be prejudiced by the introduction of proof detailing the nature of his arrest. 444 So. 2d at 15. While the state did not have benefit of Williams when this' case was tried, it is clear that appellant’s conviction was obtained in a prejudicial manner and, thus, cannot stand. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
GRIMES and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Moncrieffe v. State, 55 So. 3d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…s not in fresh pursuit of the defendant when he took him into custody in Sunrise. The unlawful nature of custody is an affirmative defense which can be raised to a charge of escape. State v. Williams, 444 So. 2d 13, 15 (Fla.1984); Marquez v. State, 450 So. 2d 345, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). In this case, the evidence presented by the state, which demonstrated the unlawfulness of the defendant’s arrest and his ensuing confinement and custody by Lauderhill police, all of which arose out of the same facts and circ…
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…ntrol over the person to be arrested. Lesser Included Offenses No lesser included offenses have been identified for this offense. Comments The State is not required to prove the technical correctness of the original arrest. Marquez v. State, 450 So. 2d 345, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Once under legal incarceration, a defendant must avail himself of help through the court system, not self-help via an escape. Lawson v. State, 312 So. 2d 522, 524 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). - 17 - This instruction was adopted in…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Williams, 444 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1984)