BEVERLY GRAPIN, PETITIONER,
v.
BERTRAM GRAPIN, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court held that divorced parents have no legal duty to pay for their emancipated adult children's college education absent a finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement, rejecting an indirect method of compelling such support through increased alimony awards based on the marital standard of living.
A trial court may not order post-majority support simply because the child is in college and the divorced parent can afford to pay. Parents have a moral but not a legal duty to support adult children's education, and courts cannot enforce such moral obligations against divorced parents when they would not enforce them against married parents.
[1] A trial court may not order a divorced parent to pay for an emancipated child's college education absent a finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement.
[2] The duty of parents to provide post-majority support for college education is a moral, not a legal, obligation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court may not order post-majority support simply because the child is in college and the divorced parent can afford to pay”
States the core holding that ability to pay alone is insufficient grounds for ordering college education support
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a 1982 dissolution of marriage action, the trial court entered a final judgment requiring Mr. Grapin to pay the expenses of his emancipated daughte…
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McDONALD, Justice.
We have for review Grapin v. Grapin, 430 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), because of conflict with Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 392 So. 2d 1377 (Fla.1980). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and approve the decision under review.
In a 1982 dissolution action the trial court entered a final judgment that included a provision requiring Mr. Grapin to pay the expenses of his emancipated daughter’s college education. The district court reversed the education costs provision in the final judgment on the grounds that a parent has no legal duty to provide post-majority support to an otherwise healthy child, absent either a finding of legal dependence or a binding contractual agreement by the parent to pay such support, neither of which conditions occurred here. We agree that a trial court may not order post-majority support simply because the child is in college and the divorced parent can afford to pay. See also Thomas v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Jones v. Jones, 421 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 319 So. 2d 31 (Fla.1975); Krogen v. Krogen, 320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).
The second district took a contrary position in Nicolay. There the district court affirmed an increase in alimony based upon the wife’s need for funds to provide a college education for her children, as expected by the parties’ standard of living during the marriage. 387 So. 2d at 506. We disagree with this indirect method of compelling unwilling divorced parents to provide college costs for their capable adult children.
While most parents willingly assist their adult children in obtaining a higher education that is increasingly necessary in today’s fast-changing world, any duty to do so is a moral rather than a legal one. Parents who remain married while their children attend college may continue supporting their children even beyond age twenty-one, but such support may be conditional or may be withdrawn at any time, and no one may bring an action to enforce continued payments. It would be fundamentally unfair for courts to enforce these moral obligations of support only against divorced parents while other parents may do as they choose. As Judge Cowart pointed out in his dissent to a decision affirming a post-majority support order for a high school student:
It denies such divorced parents their constitutional right to equal treatment under law; that being the same right to voluntarily make such decisions concerning their adult children as other, undivorced parents have under law. I cannot agree with a rule of law that permits domestic relations judges to create and enforce special duties of support in favor of adult children against divorced parents which are not provided by general law equally applicable to all parents.
Owens v. Owens, 415 So. 2d 855, 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (Cowart, J., dissenting).
Any reliance on dictum in Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 731 (Fla.1975), for the proposition that parents, married or divorced, may be required to pay post-majority education support based only upon need and the ability to pay is misplaced. The dictum from Finn refers to the societal ideal of continued parental support for the education and training of these children. These statements of concern neither created a legal duty nor provided a new cause of action.
Accordingly, we approve the decision under review and disapprove Nicolay to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (36 total)
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Walter v. Walter, 464 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1985)…ellate functions. An erroneous application of a rule of law is illustrated by a trial court order requiring payment of support for a child who has reached majority and is not dependent by reason of unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1984). An example of an appellate court’s proper determination, upon known facts, that the trial court abused its discretion is found in the oft-cited decision of Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). The decision of Kuvin v. Kuvi…
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Bingemann v. Bingemann, 551 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…(1938). See also Simon v. Simon, 123 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). Absent a showing of legal dependence or a contractual obligation, a parent is not required to pay support for a child past the child’s attainment of majority. See Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla.1984) (trial court may not order post-majority support simply because the child is in college and the divorced parent can afford to pay); Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla.1975). Similarly, in those cases where the age of majority was twen…
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McLEAN v. McLEAN, 652 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)…g the McLeans’ children to college and graduate school. It is estimated that these costs could exceed $480,000. Although Dr. McLean may well feel a moral obligation to pay these expenses, he is not legally required to pay them. See Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853 (Fla.1984). Given the parties’ strong commitment to education, they may wish to stipulate concerning these future expenses and the effect they will have on this divorce proceeding, see Madson v. Madson, 636 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994),2 but neithe…
Previewing 3 of 36 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (11 total)
- Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975)
- Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Krogen v. Krogen, 320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Nicolay v. Jacquelyn Ann Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)
- Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Knobby J. Thomas v. Thomas, 427 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Owens v. Jewell D. Owens, 415 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Jones v. Jones, 421 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Johnson v. Cubenas, 319 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1975)
- Kowalski v. Kowalski, 319 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1975)