PROTECTIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JORGE HERNANDEZ, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1984-05-01
No. 84-193
Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
450 So. 2d 864 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Protective Casualty Insurance Company appeals a judgment awarding personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to Jorge Hernandez for injuries sustained during a police arrest at a traffic stop. The court reverses, holding that PIP coverage requires a causal nexus between the motor vehicle and the injury, not merely that the injury occurs in connection with the vehicle.


Holding

The court reversed the judgment, holding that coverage under PIP requires a causal connection between the motor vehicle and the injury. An injury does not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle merely because it occurs incidentally to the vehicle's use; there must be a cause-and-effect relationship between the vehicle and the injury.


Headnotes

[1] Personal injury protection benefits under an automobile insurance policy require a causal connection between the injury and the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor…

[2] An injury sustained during a lawful arrest for a traffic infraction, caused by the arresting officers' force, does not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“[I]t is not enough that an automobile be the physical situs of an injury or that the injury occur incidentally to the use of an automobile, but that there must be a causal connection or relation between the two for liability to exist.”

Establishes the required causal nexus between the vehicle and injury for PIP coverage

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Hernandez was stopped by police for a traffic infraction. After his automobile came to a complete stop, he was forcibly removed from the vehicle, fris…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
FERGUSON, Judge.

FERGUSON, Judge.

This appeal is from a judgment on the pleadings in an action to determine coverage under the personal injury protection provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The trial court determined that plaintiff was entitled to benefits because he sustained bodily injury arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. We reverse.

The facts are not disputed. Plaintiff was apprehended by police officers at a traffic signal for a traffic infraction. After his automobile had come to a complete stop he was forcibly removed from the vehicle, then frisked and handcuffed. The injuries were caused by the arresting officers.

Appellee defends the judgment on the grounds that the injury need only grow out of, have its origin in, or flow from the use of a motor vehicle and that there is no requirement that an automobile be the instrumentality of the injury, relying on Novak v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), and Asnip v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 446 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In Novak the court held that there was coverage where an automobile operator was shot by a stranger after the operator refused to give the stranger a ride. Novak is probably indistinguishable but we choose not to follow it because, in our opinion, it is contrary to, and irreconcilable with, the statute and the following cases which have construed the statute. Second, Asnip is factually dissimilar because there the plaintiffs injuries were found to have been undoubtedly caused by a hit and run vehicle.

A similar case that was correctly decided is Reynolds v. Allstate Insurance Co., 400 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) in which no coverage was found where plaintiff suffered injury when an assailant physically heaved him from his parked car -or carried him some distance from the vehicle, then violently threw him down. Reynolds, in support of its holding that a cause and effect relationship is required, relied upon Stonewall Insurance Co. v. Wolfe, 372 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1980), which stated:

[I]t is not enough that an automobile be the physical situs of an injury or that the injury occur incidentally to the use of an automobile, but that there must be a causal connection or relation between the two for liability to exist. 372 So. 2d at 1148 (quoting General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Appleton, 355 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 830 (Fla.1978)).

The Florida Supreme Court in Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Castagna, 368 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla.1979), quoted with approval similar language from a decision of this court, Royal Indemnity Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 307 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975):

While the no-fault law was intended to remedy the concept of fault in automobile negligence cases, we do not think that tort concepts of causation were intended to be entirely abandoned. We think that by inserting the word “caused” in the statute [§ 627.736(4)(d)l, Fla.Stat. (1983) j,1 the legislature plainly intended that it would be a factor to be considered.

Plaintiffs injury was caused solely by the force exercised by police officers in effecting an arrest, and did not arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. It is not foreseeable that in the ordinary course of using a motor vehicle, an operator will suffer injury by arrest for violation of traffic laws.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for appellant.

. Section 627.736, Florida Statutes (1983) provides in part:

(1) REQUIRED BENEFITS.—

Every insurance policy complying with the security requirements of s. 627.733 shall provide personal injury protection to the named insured ... to a limit of $ 10,000 for loss

sustained by any such person as a result of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle_[e.s.]

(4) BENEFITS; WHEN DUE.— (d) The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury protection benefits for:

1. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by the owner while occupying a motor vehicle, or while not an occupant of a self-propelled vehicle if the injury is caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hernandez v. Protective Cas. Ins. Co., 473 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1985)
    …ADKINS, Justice. This cause is before us on a petition to review the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal reported as Protective Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hernandez, 450 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, based on direct and express conflict between the decision of the district court and Novak v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 424 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4t…
  • Allstate Ins. Co. v. Famigletti, 459 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
    …ert. denied 385 So. 2d 762 (Fla.1979); Florida Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Shaffer, 391 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), petition for review denied 402 So. 2d 613 (Fla.1981). In the recent case of Protective Casualty Insurance Company v. Hernandez, 450 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1984), the court reversed a determination that Plaintiff was entitled to PIP benefits. The Plaintiff, who had been apprehended by police officers for a traffic infraction, was forcibly removed from the vehicle, frisked and handcuffe…
  • Pena v. Allstate Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …case, the court, relying on Reynolds and distinguishing Novak, found no coverage in [*1260] a situation in which the insureds had been shot in a personal feud while they were seated in their car. See also, Protective Casualty Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 450 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (no p.i.p. coverage for injuries sustained when police forcibly removed insured from vehicle after stop for traffic infraction). Since I believe that the Reynolds and Famigletti holdings that coverage is not provided merely becaus…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw