DORIS A. PIROLO, APPELLANT,
v.
CENTURY FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PINELLAS COUNTY, APPELLEE
DORIS A. PIROLO, APPELLANT,
CENTURY FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF PINELLAS COUNTY, APPELLEE
450 So. 2d 875
Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984)
Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases
Opinion of the Court
LEHAN, Judge.
In this mortgage foreclosure action we find no error in the trial court’s determination that no genuine issue of any material fact existed which would have precluded the final summary judgment. As to the other point on appeal, we also find no error. See Hart v. Sanderson’s Administrators, 18 Fla. 103 (1881); Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 (1875); Hicks v. Mid-Florida Production Credit Association, 374 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
AFFIRMED.
BOARDMAN, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Fadia Daneri v. Bcre Brickell, LLC, 79 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…escrow and limiting release of the funds placed in escrow, is “to protect purchasers under preconstruction condominium contracts from loss of their deposits should the developer fail to perform its obligations.” First Sarasota Serv. Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 875, 878 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The statute restricts a developer’s use of purchaser deposit funds by requiring those funds to be kept untouched in escrow unless certain conditions are met. As to the first 10% of the purchase price, the statute requires t…
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AJH Prop. Invs. Ltd. v. Suntrust Bank, 89 So. 3d 948 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…s to whether a condominium developer receiving a deposit of twenty percent (20%) of purchase price violated statute limiting use of money placed in escrow to protect purchasers under pre-construction contracts); First Sarasota Serv. Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (reversing summary judgment as to duties under escrow agreement where question existed whether escrow agent disbursed deposit funds to developer in proper manner). Reversed and remanded. . A genuine issue of material fact remain…
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J.R.S. v. State, 483 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…look behind the express language of sections 316.1935 and 316.655(4) to determine legislative intent. It is well-established that statutory law is to be interpreted in light of express legislative intent. See First Sarasota Service Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Of course, that intent is determined primarily from the language of the statute, and where, as here, the language is clear and unambiguous, we need look no further than the statute itself. Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853, 860 (Fla…
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- Hart v. Sanderson's Administrators, 18 Fla. 103 (Fla. 1881)
- Patterson v. Taylor, 15 Fla. 336 (Fla. 1875)
- Hicks v. Mid-Florida Prod. Credit Ass'n, 374 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)