EILEEN DOMBROFF, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE AND SURVIVORS OF STANLEY DOMBROFF, DECEASED, APPELLANT,
v.
EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLEE
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The court reversed summary judgment against a deceased asbestos exposure victim's estate, holding that a Florida trial court properly acquired personal jurisdiction over Eagle-Picher Industries based on the corporation's qualification to do business in Florida and service on its designated resident agent, even though the underlying cause of action arose from the defendant's activities in Maryland.
The court held that personal jurisdiction was properly acquired under Section 48.081(3), Florida Statutes, because the defendant corporation was qualified to do business in Florida and was served through its designated resident agent in Dade County. The fact that the cause of action did not arise from the defendant's Florida business activities and instead arose from Maryland activities did not defeat jurisdiction.
[1] A trial court acquires personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation qualified to do business in Florida when its designated resident agent is served in Florida.
[2] A foreign corporation qualified to do business in Florida may be subject to personal jurisdiction even if the cause of action does not arise from its business activities…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court acquired [*924] personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation herein under Section 48.081(3), Florida Statutes (1981), because: (a) the said corporate defendant was qualified to do business in Florida, and (b) the corporate defendant's designated resident agent was served in Dade County, Florida”
Establishes the basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations qualified to do business in Florida
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStanley Dombroff's estate sued Eagle-Picher Industries for injuries allegedly caused by asbestos exposure. Eagle-Picher was qualified to do business i…
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PER CURIAM.
The final summary judgment under review is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings upon a holding that: (1) the trial court acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation herein under Section 48.081(3), Florida Statutes (1981), because: (a) the said corporate defendant was qualified to do business in Florida, and (b) the corporate defendant’s designated resident agent was served in Dade County, Florida; Cassidy v. Ice Queen International, Inc., 390 So. 2d 465 (Fla.3d DCA 1980); Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); (2) this result is not changed by the fact that the cause of action sued upon: (a) does not arise from business activities conducted by the defendant corporation in Florida, Confederation of Canada Life Insurance Co. v. Vega y Arminan, 144 So. 2d 805 (Fla.1962); Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Crown Colony Club, Ltd. v. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla.3d DCA), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 392 (Fla.1975); Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., supra at 881, and (b) arises from the defendant’s business activities in the state of Maryland prior to designating its resident agent in Florida, although accruing for statute of limitations purposes subsequent thereto; see Confederation of Canada Life Insurance Co. v. Vega y Arminan, supra; Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla.3d DCA 1984); Brown v. Armstrong World Industries, 441 So. 2d 1098 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), and (3) for purposes of this case, we assume without deciding that the issue of personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation herein was properly before the trial court for a ruling on the merits; but cf. Miller v. Marriner, 403 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Reversed and remanded.
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White v. Pepsico, Inc., 568 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1990)…corporation of the suit and provide it with an opportunity to defend. Hence, the notice requirement of the due process clause is fully satisfied. Junction Bit, 240 So. 2d at 882. See also Rose’s Stores, Inc.; Dombroff v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 450 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1984). For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and transmit this opinion to the Eleventh Circuit. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, McDonald, GRIMES…
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Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…8), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924, 89 S.Ct. 255, 21 L.Ed.2d 260 (1968); Durkin v. Costa Armatori S.p.A., 481 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Eagle-Picker Indus., Inc. v. Proverb, 464 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Dombroff v. Eagle-Picker Indus., Inc., 450 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1984). Hence, the orders as to Ranger Nationwide are affirmed.2 [*1089] We reach a different conclusion as to Genkerell, A & S Trucking and Dewline. While, as we pointed out in American…
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Hobbs v. DON Mealey Chevrolet, Inc., 642 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…179 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); American Motors Corp. v. Abrahantes, 474 So. 2d 271, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). . See Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 531 So. 2d 167 (Fla.1988); Dombroff v. Eagle-Picher Industries, 450 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 458 So. 2d 272 (Fla.1984); lunction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortgage Co., 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). See also Cassidy v. Ice Queen International, Inc., 390 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). . In Pepsico', t…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Confederation OF Canada Life Ins. Co. v. Arminan, 144 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1962)
- Copeland v. Armstrong Cork Co., 447 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Miller v. Marriner, 403 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Junction BIT & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortg. Co., 240 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970)
- Elbert Brown and Edith Brown v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 441 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Cassidy v. ICE Queen Int'l, Inc., 390 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Crown Colony Club v. Christi M. Honecker, 307 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Brevard Cnty. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction v. Special Disability Tr. Fund, 320 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1975)
- Crown Colony Club Ltd. v. Christl M. Honecker, 320 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1975)
- Killingsworth v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 327 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)