STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BOBBY L. DIXON, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the trial court's dismissal of a drug trafficking charge (Count I) against Bobby L. Dixon. The appellate court reversed, holding that when a defendant files a motion to dismiss and the state responds with a traverse that creates a factual dispute, the trial court must deny the motion to dismiss.
Yes. When a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) and the state responds with a traverse that places factual issues in dispute, the trial court is obligated to deny the motion to dismiss.
[1] A trial court must deny a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) when the state files a traverse that creates a factual disput…
[2] A traverse filed in response to a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) must be sufficiently specific to raise a factual dispute.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), and the state, in response, files a traverse which places the factual issues in dispute, the trial court is obligated to deny the motion to dismiss.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for motions to dismiss when a traverse creates a factual dispute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBobby L. Dixon was charged with trafficking in drugs (Count I), possession and sale of controlled substance (Counts II and III), and conspiracy to tra…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, State of Florida, contends that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss Count I of the amended information. We agree.
Appellee, Bobby L. Dixon, was charged by amended information with trafficking in drugs in Count I, possession and sale of a controlled substance in Counts II and III, and conspiracy to traffic in Count IV. Defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). The state filed a traverse specifically denying paragraphs six, seven, nine and ten of the motion to dismiss. Those paragraphs related only to the material elements of Count I. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to Count I with leave for the state to file an amended traverse. The state filed a motion for rehearing and an amended traverse. Upon reconsideration, the trial judge commented that he had accepted guilty pleas on Counts II, III and IV, and that those pleas might be withdrawn if the court changed its ruling on Count I. The trial judge also noted that appellee maintained his innocence as to Count I, although he had admitted guilt on the other counts. The trial court then reaffirmed the dismissal of Count I.
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), and the state, in response, files a traverse which places the factual issues in dispute, the trial court is obligated to deny the motion to dismiss. State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla.2d DCA 1978), cert. dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1212 (Fla.1978); State v. Power, 369 So. 2d 96 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d) (1984).
Here, in response to a motion to dismiss, the state filed a traverse and an amended traverse which were sufficiently specific so as to create a factual dispute. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Count I of the information should have been denied in this case. It appears that the trial judge dismissed Count I based on circumstances outside of the traverse; namely, the possibility that the defendant’s guilty pleas would be withdrawn.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court for proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
HOBSON, A.C.J., and GRIMES and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Boom, 490 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…der which granted appellee’s motion to dismiss an information. We reverse. The fact that the state filed a sworn traverse which disputed the material facts was enough to require the trial court to deny appellee’s motion to dismiss. State v. Dixon, 450 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. dismissed, 359 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1978); State v. Wood, 299 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In this case, the state’s sworn traverse presented additional facts upon which it hoped…
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State v. Dixon, 478 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…on. Subsequently, after the trial was rescheduled, Dixon entered guilty pleas to counts two, three and four and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The state appealed from the order dismissing count one and this court reversed. Dixon v. State, 450 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Following our remand, the state resumed the prosecution of count one but the lower court dismissed that count on the ground Dixon was being twice placed in jeopardy. The genesis of Dixon’s prior jeopardy contention began with h…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Cook, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- The Sch. Bd. OF Pinellas Cnty. v. State of Fla. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n & Pinellas Cnty. Custodial Union No. 1221 of the Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 354 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- State v. Power, 369 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)