RICHARD NORMAN STANLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1984-05-30
No. 83-368
ANSTEAD, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.
451 So. 2d 897 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1984) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Richard Stanley was convicted of trafficking in marijuana and conspiracy to traffic in marijuana following a joint trial with codefendants. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions, rejecting claims regarding the admission of a partially inaudible tape recording, sufficiency of evidence, and the conspiracy charge.


Holding

The court affirmed Stanley's convictions on all counts. The court held that: (1) the partially inaudible tape recording was properly admitted under Odom v. State; (2) the evidence was sufficient to establish trafficking by constructive possession when Stanley inspected the marijuana, took possession of the van keys, and was arrested before departing; (3) Stanley properly conspired with his codefendants as the information and proof linked his involvement with theirs; and (4) while allowing use of the state's transcript was not harmless error under the circumstances, it constituted harmless error here because the court reporter's transcripts showed substantial similarity with the state's transcript.


Headnotes

[1] A partially inaudible tape recording may be admitted into evidence if its contents are substantially audible and relevant.

[2] Evidence of constructive possession, including inspecting contraband and taking control of the means of transport, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for trafficking.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Stanley was arrested after he closely inspected the marijuana delivered to him in a van and took possession of the keys to the van, but before he left the scene in the van. We think this evidence was sufficient to establish trafficking by constructive possession of the marijuana.”

Court's reasoning for finding sufficient evidence of trafficking through constructive possession

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Stanley was arrested after he closely inspected marijuana delivered to him in a van and took possession of the van's keys, but before he left the scen…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of trafficking in marijuana and also convicted, along with others, of conspiring to traffic in marijuana. This same date we have issued an opinion affirming the convictions of several of appellant’s codefendants at the conclusion of a joint trial. See Kelly, B. Murphy & W. Murphy v. State, 431 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).

As we did in the companion case, we reject appellant’s claim of error in the admission of a partially inaudible tape recording on the authority of Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936 (Fla.1981).

We also reject appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for trafficking. Stanley was arrested after he closely inspected the marijuana delivered to him in a van and took possession of the keys to the van, but before he left the scene in the van. We think this evidence was sufficient to establish trafficking by constructive possession of the marijuana. Brown v. State, 412 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), affirmed, 428 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 1983).

We also reject appellant’s claim that he was only charged with conspiring with undercover police officers, and that since they could not be guilty of the offense, he lacked coeonspirators with which to conspire. We believe the information and proof properly linked appellant’s involvement with that of his codefendants mentioned above.

Lastly, we find no harmful error in the trial court’s allowing the jury to use the state’s unadmitted transcript of the tape recording while listening to the tape. See United States v. Onori, 535 F. 2d 938 (5th Cir.1976).

The record contains two transcripts of the tape recording by the court reporter. The first was made when the court listened to the tape, out of the presence of the jury, to determine audibility; the second, when the tape was played to the jury. A comparison of these transcripts indicates substantial similarity with the state’s transcript. We therefore do not believe reversible error has been demonstrated. We caution trial courts in the future, however, not to allow the use of transcripts when tape recordings are admitted into evidence, especially where the contents of the tape recordings are in dispute, as was the case here. Rather, it should be left to the jury to determine what is contained in the tapes without the intervention of a transcriber.

Accordingly, having reviewed the record and finding no reversible error, we affirm appellant’s convictions.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Matheson v. State, 468 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
    …ting into evidence the tape of the motel room meeting, even though the tape was partially inaudible or unintelligible. See Odom v. State, 403 So. 2d 936 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925, 102 S.Ct. 1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982); Stanley v. State, 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Also, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the defendant Joyce’s motion for severance. See Tifford v. State, 334 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 327 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, defend…
  • Loren v. State, 518 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
    …s being played. Golden v. State, 429 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), pet. for rev. den., 431 So. 2d 988 (Fla.1983); Taylor v. State, 508 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Harriel v. State, 508 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). But see, Stanley v. State, 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), urging caution by trial courts in the use of transcripts, especially where the contents of the tape recordings are in dispute. It is not contended here, nor could it be, that the transcript read by the jury during their viewing…
  • Uliano v. State, 536 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
    …the state claimed took place during that conversation. However, the officer was also allowed to play the tape in front of the jury and narrate the alleged conversation that took place during the inaudible portions of the tape. In Stanley v. State, 451 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 4th .DCA 1984), we held that the jury is in the best position to determine what can be heard on a tape and that it was error, albeit harmless in that instance, to allow a transcript of the tape to be read by the jurors at the same time the tap…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw