STATE OF FLORIDA/SUNLAND CENTER AND CRAWFORD & COMPANY, APPELLANTS,
v.
BLANCHE CAMPBELL, APPELLEE
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In this workers' compensation case, the Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed an award of attorney's fees to an injured worker's counsel for pursuing a claim for change of treating physician. The court held that a claim for medical benefits only, even when denominated as a change of physician, entitles the claimant to attorney's fees under Florida Statute section 440.34(2)(a).
The court held that the deputy commissioner correctly found the claim for change of treating physician to be one for medical benefits only, thereby entitling the claimant to attorney's fees. Whether the claim is denominated a 'change of treating physician' or 'additional medical treatment,' it qualifies as a claim for medical benefits only under the statute.
[1] A claim for a change of treating physician or additional medical treatment in a workers' compensation case is considered a claim for medical benefits only.
[2] The employer/carrier is responsible for attorney's fees when the only matter in controversy at the time a claim is filed is for medical benefits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Although we have been unable to document the specific reasoning employed by the Legislature with respect to section 440.34(2)(a) (now section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)), we can readily appreciate reasons why recovery of attorney's fees would be provided for in the case of medical benefits, but not for compensation benefits. One reason is that compensation benefits provide, at least to some extent, a fund from which such fees might be paid, while medical benefits result only in payments to third party medical care providers.”
Establishes the legislative intent and policy rationale for awarding attorney's fees in medical benefits claims
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlanche Campbell suffered a compensable low back injury on September 5, 1979. She was treated by several physicians and in June 1983 filed a claim for…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
In this workers’ compensation case, the employer/carrier appeal an order of the deputy commissioner which establishes entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). We affirm.
Appellee injured her low back in a compensable industrial accident on September 5, 1979. Subsequently, she was treated for this injury by several physicians. In June 1983, she filed a claim for “additional medical treatment by Dr. Ed Farrar; costs and attorney’s fees.” After a hearing, the deputy commissioner awarded the additional medical treatment in an order dated September 21, 1983. On October 17, 1983, the September order was amended to reflect that the claimant’s attorney was entitled to a fee to be paid by the employer/carrier. The deputy commissioner stated, “I base this conclusion on the fact that claim was made for a change of physicians, and I consider this to be a claim for medical benefits only pursuant to Florida Statute section 440.34(8)(c).” 1 On appeal, the employer/carrier contend that the deputy commissioner erred in finding appellee’s claim for change of treating physician to be a “claim for medical benefits only.”
In Gunn’s Quality Glass & Mirrors v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), this court discussed the legislative intent underlying section 440.34(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979):
Although we have been unable to document the specific reasoning employed by the Legislature with respect to section 440.34(2)(a) (now section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)), we can readily appreciate reasons why recovery of attorney’s fees would be provided for in the case of medical benefits, but not for compensation benefits. One reason is that compensation benefits provide, at least to some extent, a fund from which such fees might be paid, while medical benefits result only in payments to third party medical care providers.
425 So. 2d at 76 n. 4. Strode also states that the Legislature intended to make it clear that the employer/carrier are responsible for attorney’s fees when there is no matter in controversy when the claim is filed other than medical benefits. In the instant case, the award of evaluation and treatment by Dr. Farrar, whether denominated a “change of treating physician” or “additional medical treatment,” does not provide a fund from which appellant can pay her attorney but will result only in payments to a medical care provider. We hold that the deputy commissioner correctly found this claim to be one for medical benefits only.
AFFIRMED.
MILLS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . The reference to section 440.34(3)(c) appears to lpe a scrivener’s error. Since the date of accident in the instant case is September 5, 1979, the reference should be to section 440.-34(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1979) (current version at section 440.34(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983)).
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Wometco Enters. & Cigna Ins. Co. v. Cordoves, 650 So. 2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…e correctly decided and will be followed in this case and in the future. The parties have brought to our attention, however, two cases which appear to be contrary authority on this jurisdictional issue. The issue in State/Sunland Center v. Campbell, 451 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) was the correctness of a finding of entitlement to attorney’s fee. The decision, however, is silent as to whether the order on review also set the amount of the fee and contains no discussion of the jurisdictional issue. Therefor…
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Westinghouse Elec. & Gates McDonald & Co. v. Widlan, 623 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)…uch fees might be paid, while medical benefits result only in payments to third party medical care providers.” Gunn’s Quality Glass & Mirrors, Inc. v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73, 76 & n. 4 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); State of Florida/Sunland Center v. Campbell, 451 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The E/C aver this is not a “medical benefits only” claim, because Claimant himself has a claim for indemnity benefits and thus lies beyond the scope of claimants whom section 440.-34(3)(a) is designed to serve. We agree and must…
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Amitton Chery v. Se. Serv. Corp. & Wausau Ins. Co., 644 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…aring on this request. We hold that Claimant’s attorney did in fact obtain a benefit for Claimant that meets the requirements of section 440.34. See Robinson v. Howard Hall Co., 219 So. 2d 688 (Fla.1969); State of Florida/Sunland Center v. Campbell, 451 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); East Coast Tire Co. v. Denmark, 381 So. 2d 336, 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (“It is reasonable also to conclude that ‘benefits’ need no longer refer only to controverted monetary compensation benefits obtained by completing a succes…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kane v. State, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)