PHILIP SHAPIRO, APPELLANT,
v.
SANDRA G. SHAPIRO, APPELLEE
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In this divorce appeal, the court addressed whether a husband's assets held in trust for his mother's support could be considered in determining his ability to pay alimony and child support, and whether the trial court properly applied the law regarding special equity in the marital home. The court reversed and remanded, holding that funds held for a parent's support constitute an expectancy rather than a capital asset and should not be considered in calculating support obligations.
The court held that funds held for a parent's support constitute an expectancy rather than a capital asset and should not be considered in calculating a husband's ability to pay support obligations, as the husband has at minimum a moral obligation to use such funds for the parent's support while the parent lives. The court further held that any special equity award in the marital home must be based on the Landay formula for determining special equity in entireties property.
[1] Funds gifted to a spouse with a stated purpose of supporting a third party are not considered available capital assets for equitable distribution or alimony calculations…
[2] A spouse's moral obligation to support a parent is a relevant factor in determining financial status for purposes of alimony and child support.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The money in question is not really available to Philip until his mother dies because Philip, at the very least, has a moral obligation to use the money to support his mother. The money, therefore, is less like a capital asset and more like an expectancy not properly considered by the trial judge in a dissolution action.”
Establishes the court's primary holding that funds held for a parent's support are expectancies rather than capital assets in divorce proceedings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePhilip's mother transferred approximately $60,000 to Philip in 1980 with the understanding it would be used for her support until her death, after whi…
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MILLS, Judge.
Eight issues are raised in this appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment dissolving Philip and Sandra Shapiro’s twenty-two year marriage. Two issues merit discussion.
In 1980, Philip’s mother transferred approximately $60,000 of her money to Philip and filed a gift tax return thereon. Philip and Sandra both testified the money was given with the understanding that it be used for Philip’s mother’s support until her death, and only afterward by Philip personally. Philip kept the money in an account separate from his joint accounts with Sandra. He paid income taxes on the interest the money earned by deducting the amount of tax from the account. Apart from $3,700 used to pay for a trip Philip and Sandra made to Israel, and which Philip admits he owes to the account, there was no evidence Philip used any of the money for purposes other than his mother’s support. The trial judge nevertheless considered these funds in making an equitable division of assets and in determining Philip’s ability to pay alimony and child support.
Sandra argues the trial judge could properly consider the money as Philip’s. She contends that even if the court-imposed support obligations cause Philip to use funds provided by his mother for his mother’s support to instead support his children and former wife, there is no error. We cannot agree.
A husband’s capital assets should be considered in determining his ability to pay. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla.1972). But, a husband’s support of his mother is also relevant in determining his financial status. Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So. 2d 137, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). The money in question is not really available to Philip until his mother dies because Philip, at the very least, has a moral obligation to use the money to support his mother. The money, therefore, is less like a capital asset and more like an expectancy not properly considered by the trial judge in a dissolution action. Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). The trial judge erred when he considered these funds.
The second issue meriting discussion relates to the trial judge’s award to Sandra of a special equity in the former marital home. Following the final judgment in this case, the Florida Supreme Court decided Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983), setting out the formula to be applied to determine a spouse’s special equity in entireties property where that spouse furnishes some, but not all, consideration from separate funds. If Sandra is to receive a special equity in the former marital home, it must be based on the Landay formula.
Although we consider the other issues raised on appeal meritless, we recognize the trial judge’s duty to fashion an integrated decree just to all parties concerned. The final judgment is therefore reversed in all respects relating to asset division, alimony and child support, and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in view of the foregoing rulings. If deemed necessary by the trial judge, additional evidence may be taken to determine the purchase price of the former marital home.
SMITH and NIMMONS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Candy W. Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…have not yet been received are purely speculative in nature, mere expectancies, and as such are not properly included in the calculation of income for purposes of determining the need for, or the ability to provide, support. See Shapiro v. Shapiro, 452 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (holding that money which was already transferred into husband’s name under the understanding that he would use it for the mother’s support was still a mere “expectancy” which should not be used in calculating his assets for purp…
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Rovena L'Tanya R. Nelson v. Miles Vernard Nelson, 651 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…ure events. See Edwards v. Sanders, 622 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (in determining husband’s ability to pay alimony, error to rely on anticipated receipt of social security benefits due to husband’s serious medical problems); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 452 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (in determining ability to pay alimony, error to consider money given by husband’s mother, which may only be used by husband personally once mother has died); Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968) (error to consid…
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Thilem v. Thilem, 662 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…permanent periodic alimony award. Most notably, the trial court’s order lacks findings that the wife needs alimony support and that the husband has the present ability to pay. Kernan v. Kernan, 495 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 452 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Rather, the trial court seems to base the alimony award on the fact that the husband once “contributed” $49,000 to the marriage in 1992. While a trial court may base an alimony award on past earnings, Stodtko v. Stodtko, 636 So…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972)
- Sumner Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1983)
- Helene Leslie Lyons v. Lyons, 208 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- McCLOSKEY v. McCLOSKEY, 359 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)