CARL ELSON SHRINER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carl Shriner appealed the denial of his post-conviction motion for relief in a capital murder case. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial, rejecting claims that he was excluded from bench conferences and that his counsel was ineffective during sentencing. The decision was significant for applying the newly-established Strickland standards to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital sentencing.
The court held that excluding Shriner from bench conferences did not constitute error because he was present throughout the trial, raised no objection, expressed no desire to participate, and failed to show that any matter requiring his consultation was determined. The court further held that counsel was not ineffective during sentencing, as the affidavits submitted years later were merely cumulative to counsel's argument before the judge and counsel's quick adjustment to Shriner's change of position was admirable, not deficient.
[1] A defendant's absence from bench conferences during trial does not constitute fundamental error absent a showing of prejudice or that a matter was determined in which the…
[2] A defendant's own statements or actions may substantially influence or determine the reasonableness of counsel's actions.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is appellant's contention that his absence from these conferences constitutes fundamental error going to the fairness of the trial itself, but he has not shown or attempted to show that any matter was determined in which he should have been consulted.”
Establishes that bare allegation of exclusion from bench conferences, without showing prejudice or that matters requiring defendant's consultation were decided, does not constitute error.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShriner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1980 following a jury recommendation. During the sentencing phase, Shriner init…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit in and for Alachua County denying appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Carl Shriner (appellant) was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death following the jury’s recommendation. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 829 (1981). Appellant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was denied by Shriner v. Wainwright, 570 F.Supp. 766 (N.D.Fla.), aff'd, 715 F. 2d 1452 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied,— U.S.—, 104 S.Ct. 1328, 79 L.Ed.2d 723 (1984). Appellant also joined 122 others seeking relief from allegedly unconstitutional sentences of death, which claim was denied by Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 542, 70 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981). For the reasons below, we affirm the denial by the circuit court of appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief and deny his application for a stay of execution.
Appellant raises several points in his 3.850 motion, only two of which merit discussion. He first argues that he was not a participant in bench conferences held during trial, although he concedes that he was present at trial. He has not, however, shown that he suffered any prejudice nor has he proffered what he believes transpired in these various bench conferences. It is appellant’s contention that his absence from these conferences constitutes fundamental error going to the fairness of the trial itself, but he has not shown or attempted to show that any matter was determined in which he should have been consulted. Appellant was present throughout the trial, raised no objection to the bench conferences, and expressed no desire to participate in the conferences. Under the circumstances we find no error. Cf., Thomas v. State, 65 So. 2d 866 (Fla.1953).
Appellant also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to present nonstatutory mitigating factors during the sentencing phase of the trial. This contention is belied by the record. At the time evidence was presented to the jury for its consideration on a recommended sentence, appellant advised the jury that he did not desire that it consider any evidence of mitigation. This was done over counsel’s objection. Fifteen days later, after the jury recommended death, appellant reversed himself and sought mercy from the sentencing judge. In argument before the judge, appellant’s counsel referred to appellant’s disadvantaged upbringing and urged that the judge consider this in mitigation. He now claims that his attorney failed to fully investigate his disadvantaged upbringing and to present such non-statutory mitigating factors. Applying the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1981), we conclude that there was no substantial deficiency in the representation of appellant and if there was any, it was not prejudicial. The various affidavits that appellant now submits, seven years later, are merely cumulative to what counsel argued before the trial judge during the sentencing phase. Considering that appellant took the position only fifteen days previous that he did not desire mitigation, counsel’s argument before the judge was an admirable adjustment to appellant’s change of mind and cannot be said to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As Justice O’Connor observed in Strickland:
The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions....
Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
. Appellant’s remaining points have been considered but do not merit discussion.
The denial of appellant’s 3.850 motion is affirmed. His application for a stay of execution is denied. No petition for rehearing will be entertained.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hardwick v. Dugger, 648 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1994)…ed at these conferences that required his consultation, nor has he demonstrated that any prejudice resulted from his absence during the depositions. Under these circumstances, Hardwick is not entitled to postcon-viction relief. See Shriner v. State, 452 So. 2d 929, 930 (Fla.1984). To the extent that the proeedurally barred issues raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we find no merit as Hardwick has failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice as required by Strickland Petition for…
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Moore v. State, 458 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…stance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Morgan v. State (Fla.1984) (case no. 63,679, opinion filed September 11, 1984) [9 FLW 428]; Adams v. State, 456 So. 2d 888 (Fla.1984); Shriner v. State, 452 So. 2d 929 (Fla.1984); Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533 (Fla.1984); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1981). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981)
- Brown v. Wainwright, 454 U.S. 1000 (U.S. 1981)
- Massie v. Sumner, 449 U.S. 1103 (U.S. 1981)
- Brown v. Louie L. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Daley, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981)
- Shriner v. State, 386 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1980)
- Shriner v. Louie L. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1983)
- Shriner v. Wainwright, 570 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Fla. 1982)
- Thomas v. State, 65 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1953)