PAUL GLEN YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-07-20
No. 84-557
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
453 So. 2d 182 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Paul Glen Young appealed the summary denial of his postconviction motion claiming the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony against him at trial. The appellate court reversed in part, finding the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing or attached record portions refuting the perjury allegation before denying the motion.


Holding

The trial court erred in summarily denying Young's perjury allegation without either conducting an evidentiary hearing or attaching portions of the record that conclusively refute the allegation. The trial court on remand must either summarily deny with attached refuting record portions or hold an evidentiary hearing.


Headnotes

[1] A postconviction motion alleging the knowing use of perjured testimony by the state may entitle a defendant to relief.

[2] A trial court must either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach record portions conclusively refuting a postconviction claim to summarily deny the motion.

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Key Quotes

“The allegation that perjured testimony was used with the state's knowledge, if true, may entitle appellant to relief.”

Establishes that Young's core claim, if proven, warrants postconviction relief under established law

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Facts & Procedural History

Young raised two points in his postconviction relief motion. Regarding the first point, he alleged that testimony presented at trial was perjured and …

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Judge.

OTT, Judge.

This appeal is from the summary denial of a motion seeking postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Appellant raised two points in the motion. In paragraph two he alleges that certain testimony adduced at trial was perjured and that the state was aware, at the time, that the testimony given was perjured. Attached to appellant’s motion in support of this allegation were depositions of two individuals who had encountered the witness who allegedly committed perjury while the three were incarcerated in the Reception Medical Center, Lake Butler. According to the depositions, the witness had related to both individuals that he had never met appellant, had no direct knowledge concerning appellant’s case, and had become familiar with the case through newspaper accounts. The witness told the individuals he agreed to testify against appellant as part of a bargain with the state. The state promised the witness a more favorable sentence in exchange for the witness’s damaging testimony. An affidavit of a prisoner in the Pasco County Jail told of a similar encounter with the witness. The allegation that perjured testimony was used with the state’s knowledge, if true, may entitle appellant to relief. See Rayburn v. State, 203 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), appeal after remand, 216 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Presley v. State, 347 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The trial court, however, failed to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach portions of the record which refute that allegation.

Accordingly, we reverse in part the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion and remand the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court may either again summarily deny the motion as to the allegation specified, and attach to its order those portions of the record which conclusively show appellant is not entitled to relief, or hold an evidentiary hearing and then rule on the ground alleged in the above portion of the motion. See Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.850. See also Lofton v. State, 442 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), and Jones v. State, 421 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). To obtain further review, any aggrieved party must appeal the new ruling of the trial court.

The trial judge was correct in denying the appellant’s motion as to the other point raised therein. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Rogers v. State, 467 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
    …stified in not granting an evidentiary hearing on these claims. See Hitchcock, 432 So. 2d at 43. However, a defendant may be entitled to post-conviction relief if perjured testimony at trial was used with the state’s knowledge. See Young v. State, 453 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Monson v. State, 443 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel is a well-recognized ground for relief under rule 3.850. Monson, 443 So. 2d at 1062; Allen v. State, 427 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 19…

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