CHARLES MILLER MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
HAROLD R. SWENSON, WARDEN, MISSOURI STATE PENITENTIARY, APPELLEE
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The court held that the petitioner's guilty pleas were voluntarily made, even if entered to avoid the death penalty, and the state met its burden of proof regarding voluntariness.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and robbery to avoid a potential death penalty. The state could not produce a transcript of the origi…
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[*1021] PER CURIAM.
We review here the District Court’s finding, 360 F.Supp. 583, that the petitioner’s pleas of guilty to first degree murder and first degree robbery were voluntarily made on advice of counsel with a full awareness of the consequences of the pleas. After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that this finding is not clearly erroneous. See, Crowe v. South Dakota, 484 F. 2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1973); Crosswhite v. Swen-son, 444 F. 2d 648 (8th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1042, 92 S.Ct. 1320, 31 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972).
It seems clear from the record that the petitioner entered the pleas to avoid a possible death penalty in the event the jury found him guilty. The possibility that these events would occur does not appear to have been remote, as a eodefendant was found guilty and executed, and the evidence against the petitioner appears to have been strong. The fact that the pleas were entered to avoid this possibility does not, in and of itself, require that the pleas be set aside as involuntary. See, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L. Ed.2d 785 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).
The petitioner argues that the burden of proving voluntariness shifted to the state because the state was unable to produce a transcript of the pleas to the state post-conviction court, the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, the federal District Court, or this Court. He also argues that the state’s inability to produce the transcript at these hearings was the result of its own negligence and that, under these circumstances, the state has the burden of proving that the pleas were voluntarily entered. The government cites United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 428 F. 2d 1401, 1404 (3rd Cir. 1970), as authority to the contrary. We need not reach this issue. If the burden rested with the state, it was nonetheless sustained. All available witnesses were called to reconstruct the record. Their testimony is sufficiently strong to sustain the finding of volun-tariness.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the absence of the transcript was not caused by the negligence of the state. The court reporter was in poor health when the transcript of the guilty pleas was ordered eight years after the pleas were entered. He died before he could undertake typing the transcript and no other reporter could be found who could read his notes.
Affirmed.
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Authorities Cited
- Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1970)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1970)
- Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (U.S. 1970)
- United States ex rel. Charles Grays v. Rundle, 428 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1970)
- Crowe v. State OF S.D., 484 F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1973)
- Delbert R. Crosswhite v. Swenson, 444 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1971)
- City of Thousand Oaks v. Van Nuys Publ'g Co., Inc., 405 U.S. 1042 (U.S. 1972)
- Anderson v. Colorado, 405 U.S. 1042 (U.S. 1972)