MICHAEL WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-08-01
No. 84-31
RYDER, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
453 So. 2d 516 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Michael Williams appealed his conviction for burglary with assault, challenging the filing of an amended information, the trial court's time limitation on closing arguments, and the imposition of attorney's fees as a parole condition. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence while striking a clerical error in the judgment.


Holding

The court held that Williams was not prejudiced by any of these three issues. First, the prosecution was not required to specify the particular offense intended within the premises, but must provide such specificity before trial if timely requested, and Williams failed to request it or seek a continuance. Second, the forty-five minute time limitation for closing arguments was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Third, trial courts are not precluded from recommending attorney's fees as a condition of parole.


Headnotes

[1] A burglary charge need not specify the particular offense intended within the premises if the prosecution provides such specificity before trial upon timely request by th…

[2] A defendant's failure to request specificity regarding the intended offense in a burglary charge, or to seek further discovery or a continuance after an amended informati…

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“it is not per se required that a burglary charge specify the particular offense which the accused allegedly intended to commit within the premises, but the prosecution must furnish this specificity "before the case goes to trial if timely requested by the defendant."”

Establishes the standard for specificity in burglary charges and when it must be provided

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Williams was charged with burglary with assault under Florida law. The state filed an amended information twelve days before trial that deleted refere…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BOARDMAN, Judge.

BOARDMAN, Judge.

Appellant Michael Williams challenges his judgment and sentence for burglary with assault under section 810.02(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

We reject appellant’s assertion that he was prejudiced by the filing of an amended information twelve days before trial which deleted reference to the specific offense which appellant allegedly intended to commit within the burglarized premises. As the supreme court noted in State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla.1983), it is not per se required that a burglary charge specify the particular offense which the accused allegedly intended to commit within the premises, but the prosecution must furnish this specificity “before the case goes to trial if timely requested by the defendant.” Id. at 69.

Accord Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).

Appellant’s failure to request such specificity in the time remaining before trial certainly undermines his contention that he deemed such information crucial to his defense. We also note that appellant did not request a continuance or engage in any discovery in response to the amended information. These considerations, coupled with a record which fails to demonstrate any prejudice whatsoever, mandate affirmance on this issue.

We also find no merit in appellant’s contention that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s imposition of a forty-five minute time limitation for each side’s closing argument. Under the facts and circumstances presented, we do not consider this limitation unreasonable. See McDuffee v. State, 55 Fla. 125, 46 So. 721 (1908).

Finally, the record supports the state’s assertion that the trial court merely recommended the imposition of attorney’s fees as a condition of parole. Because a trial court is not precluded from making such a recommendation, Alexander v. State, 425 So. 2d 1197, 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), appellant’s third point on appeal also demonstrates no reversible error. In reviewing the written judgment rendered in this case, we could not help but note that it designates section “755.087(1)-1,” Florida Statutes (1983), as one of the statutes violated by appellant’s criminal conduct. This reference obviously is typographically incorrect as well as legally inconsistent with both the jury’s verdict and the lawful sentence actually imposed.

Accordingly, we strike this apparent clerical error.

We affirm appellant’s judgment and sentence in all other respects.

RYDER, C.J., and HOBSON, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw