JERRY MAURICE WARD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jerry Maurice Ward appeals his grand theft conviction, arguing the stolen property should have been suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful stop. The appellate court agrees, finding the stop lacked constitutional justification and reversing the conviction.
The trial court erred in refusing to suppress the stolen property because the stop was unconstitutional. Defendant's presence at midnight in an area recently victimized by burglaries, standing alone, is insufficient to justify even an investigative stop under Florida law.
[1] An investigative stop is unlawful when based solely on the defendant's presence in a high-crime area and the recent commission of burglaries in the vicinity.
[2] A defendant's behavior must be unusual or incongruous to justify an investigative stop.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In State v. Levin, 452 So.2d 562 (Fla.1984), the supreme court disapproved this court's holding in Boal v. State, 368 So.2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), making it abundantly clear that these two factors, standing alone, are insufficient to justify even an investigative stop under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1983).”
Establishes that presence at midnight in an area recently victimized by burglaries cannot alone justify a stop
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn officer observed Ward and a companion walking along Marsh Avenue near Ballard Road in Fort Myers at midnight in an area recently victimized by burg…
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OTT, Judge.
Defendant appeals from a conviction of grand theft. We find that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the stolen items as the product of an unlawful stop and remand to the trial court.
In a pretrial motion, defendant moved to suppress the stolen property as the fruit of an illegal stop. At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that he observed defendant and a companion walking along Marsh Avenue just north of Ballard Road in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. According to the officer, the general vicinity including a school had been recently victimized by burglaries. After approximately forty-five seconds of observation, he stopped the men out of fear for the safety of the businesses, school building, and residences in the area. The officer admitted that the men’s behavior was not unusual or incongruous during the short observation period. During the stop, defendant supplied the officer with a false name and birthdate. Defendant was then arrested on an obstruction of justice charge. During the booking process on that charge, items were discovered under defendant’s hat that led to the instant grand theft charge and conviction.
The sole basis for the stop was defendant’s presence at midnight in an area recently victimized by burglaries. In State v. Levin, 452 So. 2d 562 (Fla.1984), the supreme court disapproved this court’s holding in Boal v. State, 368 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), making it abundantly clear that these two factors, standing alone, are insufficient to justify even an investigative stop under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1983).
Nothing that transpires after the initial stop can be used to validate the unlawful stop. See Vollmer v. State, 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), petition for review dismissed, 347 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1977).
The trial court erred in not granting defendant’s motion to suppress the property underlying the grand theft charge. Accordingly, we REVERSE defendant’s conviction of grand theft, SET ASIDE the sentence, and REMAND to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RYDER, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…889 (1968). . It is immaterial to our Fourth Amendment analysis that the napkin turned out to contain cocaine. Only the facts known to the officers at the time of the stop are relevant to a determination of reasonable suspicion. See Ward v. State, 453 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)(citing Vollmer v. State, 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), petition for review dismissed, 347 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1977), for the principle that nothing that transpires after the initial stop can be used to validate the unlawful stop…
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Estep v. State, 597 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…cer said that the reason he stopped the car was to find out why the occupants wanted to go into a closed service station. This does not rise to the level of a founded suspicion. See Aguila v. State, 567 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Ward v. State, 453 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). As argued by appellant, these circumstances are equally suggestive of travel-weary tourists looking for a restroom or a cup of coffee. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and PARKER and ALTE…
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Jenkins v. State, 524 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…light of the officer’s knowledge.” G.J.P. v. State, 469 So. 2d 826, 827 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). An individual’s presence in a high crime area is not a sufficient basis upon which to conclude he is engaged in, or about to commit, a crime. Ward v. State, 453 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Furthermore, the defendant’s action in placing his hand behind his back was an insufficient basis to raise a bare suspicion to a founded suspicion. See R.B. v. State, 429 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (fact that defendant quickly…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lucinda Stratton v. McQUEEN, 337 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- State v. Levin, 452 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1984)
- Tropigas S. A. v. Efrain Sanchez, 368 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- State v. Vollmer, 347 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1977)
- Huskey Realty v. Dimension Four Int'l Ltd., 347 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1977)