ARISTEK COMMUNITIES, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, DOING BUSINESS AS LAKEWOOD VILLAGE AND ARISTEK PROPERTIES, LTD., A FOREIGN CORPORATION DOING BUSINESS AS LAKEWOOD VILLAGE, APPELLANTS/CROSS APPELLEES,
v.
LEE W. FULLER, ET AL., APPELLEES/CROSS APPELLANTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Tenants at a mobile home park challenged rent increases as unconscionable under Florida law. The trial court improperly submitted the unconscionability issue to a jury, which found the increases unconscionable based on fair market value. The appellate court reversed, holding that unconscionability determinations must be made by the court as a matter of law, not by jury verdict.
Unconscionability of mobile home lot rental agreements must be determined by the court as a matter of law, not submitted to a jury. The submission of this issue to a jury constituted harmful error requiring reversal and remand. Additionally, the jury verdict's reliance solely on fair market rental value was incomplete and unsupported by the evidence.
[1] A determination of unconscionability in a mobile home lot rental agreement is a matter of law for the court, not a question for the jury.
[2] Submitting the issue of unconscionability to a jury constitutes harmful error if a different result would likely have been reached absent the error.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Contrary to the provisions of Section 83.-754, Florida Statutes (1983), the trial court did not determine the issue of unconsciona-bility. Instead, and erroneously, the issue was submitted to a jury.”
Establishes the core error—that unconscionability must be determined by the court, not the jury
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTenants at Lakewood Village mobile home park sued the owners challenging rent increases from 1979 to 1983 as unconscionable. The trial court submitted…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Fair Rental Value cases and more on FLexlaw
WALDEN, Judge.
The tenants at a mobile home park sued the park owners saying the rent increases from 1979 to 1983 were unconscionable. The tenants won. Owners appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Contrary to the provisions of Section 83.-754, Florida Statutes (1983),1 the trial court did not determine the issue of unconsciona-bility. Instead, and erroneously, the issue was submitted to a jury. It returned a special verdict as follows:
Are the rent increases on lots in Lakewood Village made from 1979 to date by the defendants unconscionable as the rent was increased beyond the fair market rental value of each lot? [emphasis supplied]
YES _JX_ NO_.
Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing and determined the dollar value of a reasonable rent, the amount of rebates, and then awarded the tenants reasonable attorney fees.
We hold that the submission of the case to the jury, as above outlined, constituted harmful error which mandates reversal and remand.
We are aware that in some cases the wrongful submission of a case to a jury may constitute harmless error. See Gaulden v. Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
The test for harmful error is whether but for such error a different result would have been reached. Anthony v. Douglas, 201 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967).
The basis for our determination that the error was harmful starts with the wording of the verdict. In order for the jury to determine that the increases were unconscionable, it would have to find and base its decision solely on a finding that “the rent was increased beyond the fair market rental value of each lot.”
First, the statute does not prescribe the above criteria. In our opinion, the above criteria would be a powerful force in making a determination of unconscionability. However, there are other bases that may support a finding of unconscionability. See Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, 398 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F.Supp. 689 (S.D.Fla.1979).
Second, most compellingly, there was no evidence adduced that we could find that would support the fact that the rent was increased beyond the fair market rental value of each lot. Indeed, the evidence was to the contrary.
In light of the reversal on the merits, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees without prejudice for re-determination based on the outcome of the case in chief.
The tenants’ cross appeal is without merit.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
LETTS and HERSEY, JJ., concur. . 83.754 Unconscionable lot rental agreements.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a mobile home lot rental agreement, or any provision of the rental agreement, to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may:
(a) Refuse to enforce the rental agreement.
(b) Enforce the remainder of the rental agreement without the unconscionable provision.
(c) So limit the application of any unconscionable provision as to avoid any unconscionable result. (Emphasis added)
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (16 total)
-
Special v. Ivo Baux, M.D., 79 So. 3d 755 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…(civil commitment); Kammer v. Hurley, 765 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Pascale v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 656 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vosburgh, 480 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Aristek Cmtys., Inc. v. Fuller, 453 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Anthony v. Douglas, 201 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). See also Dessanti v. Contreras, 695 So. 2d 845, 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (Hauser, Assoc. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Pascale, Aristek, and Anthony…
-
Alan and Nancy Garrett v. Janiewski, 480 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…res reversal of the judgment. Lest we be accused of substituting our judgment for that of the trial judge on a fact question, we would point out that the question of unconscionability is one of law for the court. Aristek Communities, Inc. v. Fuller, 453 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Central Ohio Co-operative Milk Producers v. Rowland, 29 Ohio App.2d 236, 281 N.E. 2d 42 (1972); Zicari v. Joseph Harris Company, 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969); Haugen v. Ford Motor Company, 219 N.W. 2d 462 (N.D.1974); Sc…
-
Pascale v. Fed. Express Corp., 656 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…harmless if it does not injuriously affect the substantial rights of the complaining party. § 59.041, Fla.Stat. (1993). The test is whether, but for the error, a different result would have been reached. Aristek Communities, Inc. v. Full [*1354] er, 453 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Anthony v. Douglas, 201 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), cert. denied, 210 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1968). Section 59.041, Florida Statutes (1993), provides that the reviewing court must examine the entire case to determine whether “the…
Previewing 3 of 16 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Kohl v. BAY Colony Club Condo., Inc., 398 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- Roscoe T. Anthony, Jr. v. Douglas, 201 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967)
- Gaulden v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)