STATE EX REL. GAS KWICK, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
DOYLE CONNER, COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Gas Kwick, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of Florida's petroleum dealer statute under substantive due process, equal protection, and vagueness doctrines. The District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of mandamus, finding the statute constitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon v. Maryland, and certified three constitutional questions to the Florida Supreme Court.
The statute does not violate substantive due process, equal protection, or vagueness requirements. The term 'retail service station' and the 90 percent requirement are sufficiently clear in light of legislative intent. The divestiture provisions do not violate equal protection because the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
[1] A state statute regulating petroleum product dealers is a lawful exercise of the state's police power when it is substantially similar to a statute previously upheld by the U.S. …
[2] The term "retail service station" in a statute regulating petroleum product dealers includes all stations selling gasoline at retail, regardless of whether they offer ful…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In Exxon, supra, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge on constitutional grounds to a substantially similar Maryland statute (Md.Code Ann. Art. 56 § 157E [Supp.1977]), holding that legislative enactment constituted a lawful exercise of the State's police power.”
Establishes that the Exxon decision controls the substantive due process analysis and supports upholding the Florida statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGas Kwick, Inc. sought a writ of mandamus challenging Section 526.151, Florida Statutes, which restricts producers and refiners of petroleum products …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Unconstitutional Vagueness cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying petition for writ of mandamus, which petition alleged that Section 526.151, Florida Statutes1 is an unlawful exercise of the State’s police power, denies producers and refiners of petroleum products equal protection of the laws, and is unconstitutionally vague. The trial court, relying upon the court’s own 1975 decision2 declaring the statute unconstitutional for the above-stated reasons, summarily rejected appellant’s contention that the substantive due process issue was controlled by Exxon Corporation v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). In Exxon, supra, the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge on constitutional grounds to a substantially similar Maryland statute (Md.Code Ann. Art. 56 § 157E [Supp.1977]), holding that legislative enactment constituted a lawful exercise of the State’s police power. Appellee has failed to explain why that decision is not controlling of the same issue raised as to Florida’s statute.
We further conclude that the term “retail service station,” the language set forth in Subsection (2) of the Act requiring specified producers and refiners to “apply all equipment rental charges uniformly to all retail service station dealers which they supply” and the 90 percent requirement of Subsection (3) of the Act are not unconstitutionally vague or ambiguous in light of the legislative intent in enacting Section 526.151, Florida Statutes. The term “all classes of retail service stations” is construed to include all stations, whether providing full service or not, which supply gasoline at retail. Nor do the divestiture provisions of the Act constitute a denial of the equal protection since the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate State interest. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corporation, 279 Md. 410, 370 A. 2d 1102, 1119 (1977), affirmed sub nom, Exxon Corporation v. Maryland, supra.
Accordingly, the judgment below is reversed.
The issues raised being of great public importance and the statute having apparently remained unenforced for almost a decade, we certify the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court:
1. DOES SECTION 526.151, FLORIDA STATUTES, VIOLATE THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FLORIDA AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS?
2. ARE THE TERM “RETAIL SERVICE STATION,” AS SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION (2) OF THE ACT RE QUIRING SPECIFIED PRODUCERS AND REFINERS TO “APPLY ALL EQUIPMENT RENTAL CHARGES UNIFORMLY TO ALL RETAIL SERVICE STATION DEALERS WHICH THEY SUPPLY,” AND/OR THE 90 PERCENT REQUIREMENT OF SUBSECTION (3) OF THE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND/OR AMBIGUOUS?
3. DO THE DIVESTITURE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT THEY APPLY ONLY TO PRODUCERS AND REFINERS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NOT TO OTHER MAJOR INTEGRATED COMPANIES?
BOOTH, SHIVERS and JOANOS, JJ., concur. . Section 526.151, Florida Statutes:
Petroleum products dealers; restrictions.—
(1) After October 1, 1974, no producer, refiner, or a subsidiary of any producer or refiner, shall operate, with company personnel, in excess of 3 percent of the total number of all classes of retail service stations selling its petroleum products, under its own brand or secondary brand.
(2) Every producer or refiner of petroleum products supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service station dealers shall apply all equipment rental charges uniformly to all retail service station dealers which they supply.
(3) This section shall not apply to any service station operated by a producer or refiner of petroleum products who purchases or obtains more than 90 percent of the unrefined petroleum products to be so refined from another producer or refiner of petroleum products.
(4)A circuit court or circuit judge shall have jurisdiction, upon hearing and for cause shown, to grant an injunction restraining any person from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of this section.
. That decision (Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil Company, Union Oil Company of California, and Phillips Petroleum Company v. Conner, Cases No. 74-1449, 74-1577, and 74-1772, Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County [January 23, 1975]), holding the statute unconstitutional, is unreported and was never appealed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Kirvin, 718 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…Management Act is sufficiently defined “when measured by common usage and understanding to convey to persons of ordinary intelligence who is included in its term” and thus such term does not render statute unconstitutionally vague); State v. Conner, 453 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (construing term “all classes of retail service stations” and finding provision containing term not unconstitutionally vague). We must determine, then, whether common usage and understanding of the term “mile,” as it appears…
-
Sixty Enters., Inc. v. Roman & Ciro, Inc., 601 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…tly operating retail motor fuel facilities, and was struck down by a Florida circuit court in 1975, after several major refiners challenged the statute as an unlawful exercise of the state’s police power. See State ex rel. Gas Kwick, Inc. v. Conner, 453 So. 2d 863, 864 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(citing to unreported decision of Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil Company, Union Oil Company of California, and Phillips Petroleum Company v. Conner, Nos. 74-1449, 74-1577, and 74-1772 (Fla. 2d Cir.Ct., January 23, 1975). T…
Authorities Cited
- Exxon Corp. v. Governor OF Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (U.S. 1978)