JOHN ZAVIER LINNEHAN, MARTINA WHITE LINNEHAN, AND DANIEL EDWARDS MOORE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Three appellants convicted of criminal mischief, negligence, resisting arrest, trespass, and unlawful assembly at a nuclear weapons facility demonstration appealed the trial court's exclusion of evidence supporting a necessity defense. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the excluded evidence was properly deemed irrelevant because the appellants could not satisfy the essential elements of the necessity defense.
The trial court properly excluded the evidence because it was irrelevant and would not have established the necessity defense. The appellants could not satisfy the essential elements of the necessity defense, specifically the requirements that there be no adequate alternative means to avoid the threatened harm and that a direct causal relationship exist between the action taken and avoidance of the harm.
[1] The necessity defense requires a reasonable belief that actions were necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm.
[2] The necessity defense requires that there be no other adequate means to avoid the threatened harm.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“even if possession of nuclear weapons is illegal as defendants contend — an issue that we do not address — the necessity defense is inapplicable. As sought to be applied here, essential elements of the defense are that defendants must have reasonably believed that their action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm, that there are no other adequate means except those which were employed to avoid the threatened harm, and that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.”
Establishes the three essential elements of the necessity defense and demonstrates why the defense failed here even assuming nuclear weapons possession was illegal.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants participated in a demonstration at a plant believed to manufacture nuclear weapons components. They were convicted of criminal mischief, cu…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants were convicted of criminal mischief, culpable negligence, resisting arrest without violence, trespass, and unlawful assembly. The charges arose out of a demonstration at a plant believed to manufacture nuclear weapons components. The trial court had granted the state’s motion in limine to exclude evidence to be offered by appellants in support of their “necessity” defense. The gist of that defense was that defendants had a reasonable belief that their actions were necessary to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the United States in violation of international law.
On appeal appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine and refusing to admit certain evidence offered in support of that defense. We disagree and affirm.
We conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling the evidence would be irrelevant because the evidence would not have established the “necessity” defense. United States v. Seward, 687 F. 2d 1270, 1274-76 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1147, 103 S.Ct. 789, 74 L.Ed.2d 995 (1983). The language of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Cassidy, 616 F. 2d 101 (4th Cir.1979), reflects our conclusions in the case at hand:
[E]ven if possession of nuclear weapons is illegal as defendants contend — an issue that we do not address — the necessity defense is inapplicable. As sought to be applied here, essential elements of the defense are that defendants must have reasonably believed that their action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm, that there are no other adequate means except those which were employed to avoid the threatened harm, and that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm. Even if we accept defendants’ reasonable belief, we do not think that the elements of lack of other adequate means or direct causal relationship could be satisfied.
Id. at 102 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Lowe, 654 F. 2d 562, 566-67 (9th Cir.1981). We are not persuaded otherwise by the majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Berrigan, — Pa.Super. -, 472 A. 2d 1099 (1984).
AFFIRMED.
RYDER, C.J., and GRIMES and LE-HAN, JJ., concur.
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Hill v. State, 688 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1996)…that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. While section 776.012 is not identical to the defense of necessity, see Linnehan v. State, 454 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984),4 we find the ease law cited by the State relevant to our analysis here, as both the necessity defense and section 776.012 contemplate that a defendant may act to prevent some “harm,” even if the defendant’s act otherwise would be…1 / 2
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Yoos v. State, 522 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…ought to assert the defense that they had the right under international law to commit such trespass because they considered it necessary to prevent the commission of a war crime or a crime against humanity. The trial court, citing Linnehan v. State, 454 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), granted the state’s motion in limine, thereby denying the appellants a forum in which to argue their views on war, world peace, and the sovereignty of international law. Reserving their right to obtain appellate review of this ru…
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Clark v. State, 876 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…the date of the offenses at issue here. There was no evidence, however, showing that in committing the offenses charged against him Clark “reasonably believed that [his] action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm.” Linnehan v. State, 454 So. 2d 625, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (quoting United States v. Cassidy, 616 F. 2d 101, 102 (4th Cir.1979)). Even if Clark’s contention that he had been previously abused by law enforcement officers is accepted as true, that circumstance would as a matter of law…
Authorities Cited
- United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982)
- Kock v. Quaker Oats Co., 459 U.S. 1147 (U.S. 1983)
- United States v. Justina Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981)
- Taylor v. Howard, 459 U.S. 1147 (U.S. 1983)
- United States v. Cassidy, 616 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1979)