KATHRYN R. LANES, APPELLANT,
v.
DANIEL ROBERT LANES, APPELLEE
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A wife appeals the denial of her motion for relief from a default judgment of dissolution, arguing she was denied her day in court due to her husband's misleading assurances of reconciliation, a misdirected attorney letter, and lack of notice of suit reactivation. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding the wife satisfied the requirements for relief under Rule 1.540(b) based on excusable mistake.
The court held that the wife sustained her burden of demonstrating excusable mistake under Rule 1.540(b) and was entitled to relief from the default judgment. The combination of the husband's assurances of reconciliation, the parties' apparent reconciliation attempts, the informal abatement of the action, and the misdirected attorney letter deprived the wife of her day in court.
[1] A party may be entitled to relief from a final judgment of dissolution when assurances of reconciliation and a misaddressed letter deprive them of notice and an opportuni…
[2] Reconciliation attempts between parties in a dissolution action may support a finding of mistake or excusable neglect for failing to respond to pleadings.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the wife sustained her burden of demonstrating a "mistake" as contemplated in Rule 1.540(b) and, thus, her entitlement to relief from judgment”
Establishes that the wife met the legal standard for relief under the applicable rule based on excusable mistake
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband filed a dissolution petition in November 1982. The wife did not answer because the husband assured her he was not serious and they could r…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant-wife, Kathryn Lanes, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion for relief from a final judgment of dissolution. We reverse.
Appellee-husband, Daniel Lanes, filed a petition for dissolution in November, 1982. Mrs. Lanes did not respond with an answer because her husband assured her that he was not serious about the divorce and that they could reconcile their differences. In fact, the couple continued to live together, with minor interruptions, 'at least until May, and possibly through mid-July of 1983. On one occasion, the wife consulted with an attorney while the reconciliation attempt was suspended in late January or early February, 1983. The wife and her counsel discussed the need to file an answer. However, the husband and wife reconciled again in mid-February and, consequently, the wife’s failure to file responsive pleadings went uncorrected.
In June of 1983, the husband reactivated the dissolution action by sending a notice to the wife’s attorney. The husband did not inform his wife of the suit’s reactivation. Moreover, a letter to the wife from her attorney, which disclosed the reactivation, was inexplicably misaddressed. Thereafter, the trial court entered a default and final judgment of dissolution which awarded the wife custody of the minor child and nominal child support. The date of the final judgment of dissolution was July 1, 1983.
The wife learned of the final judgment of dissolution shortly after its entry. On August 22, 1983, she filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), Fla.R.Civ.P., and asserted that she did not know of the suit’s reactivation and did not receive notice of the final hearing. She also alleged that she was entitled to a substantial financial settlement and possession of the marital residence during the child’s minority. Although the trial court increased the child support award, it denied the wife’s motion for relief from judgment.
The combination of these events: (1) the husband’s repeated assurances to wife that he would not attempt to obtain a divorce, (2) the parties’ apparent, albeit some times rocky, attempt to reconcile (which is favored by the law, see Little v. Little, 298 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972); § 61.001(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1983)), (3) the informal but nonetheless real abatement of the action between November, 1982, and June, 1983, and (4) the misdirection of the attorney’s letter informing the wife of the suit’s reactivation, deprived the wife of “her day in court.” Under these circumstances, the wife sustained her burden of demonstrating a “mistake” as contemplated in Rule 1.540(b) and, thus, her entitlement to relief from judgment. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant that relief. See Barry v. Barry, 324 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
Accordingly, the default and final judgment of dissolution are vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and LETTS and HURLEY, JJ., concur.
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Taylor v. Taylor, 67 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…husband’s unrebutted sworn statements indicate that the wife led him to believe that she was not pursuing the dissolution. Thus, there was no need for him to provide another address or have his mail forwarded to another address. See Lanes v. Lanes, 454 So. 2d 782, 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (the wife sustained her burden on motion for relief from judgment based on, among other things, the husband’s repeated assurances to her that he would not attempt to obtain a divorce). We further reject the wife’s argument…
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Tenneboe v. Tenneboe, 558 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…oss, 334 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (overreaching); Demaggio v. Demaggio, 317 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (fraud); Kern v. Kern, 291 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 657 (Fla.1974) (misrepresentation). See also Lanes v. Lanes, 454 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“mistake” under Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b)). Equally well established in Florida law is the principle that lack of legal representation of one of the parties to a marital settlement agreement is not sufficient, in and of itself, as a…
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Gahagen v. Mahoney, 511 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…re of singular importance in determining whether or not relief under Rule 1.540(b) should be [*1127] Edwards v. City of Fort Walton granted. Beach, 271 So. 2d 136 (Fla.1972). Two cases cited by appellant appear directly on point. In Lanes v. Lanes, 454 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), the wife failed to file an answer to the dissolution petition because the husband assured her he would not pursue the divorce. This court held that denial of the wife’s motion to vacate the default and final judgment was an abus…
Authorities Cited
- Riley v. Riley, 271 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Barry v. Garl W. Barry, 324 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Paul v. Little, 298 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)