AMERICAN AIR TRANSPORT, INC., AND GEORGE M. CHAPPELL, APPELLANTS,
v.
SEAFIRST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, A COLORADO CORPORATION, AND EDWARD CONDON, D/B/A PALM BEACH AVIATION MAINTENANCE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
American Air Transport and George Chappell appealed a non-final order denying their motion to dismiss or transfer a replevin action filed by Seafirst Commercial Corporation in Palm Beach County. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that Seafirst's counterclaim was not compulsory and that venue in Palm Beach County was proper because the aircraft at issue was located there.
Palm Beach County was the proper venue for the replevin action. Seafirst's counterclaim was not compulsory because it involved different claims (enforcement of promissory note and security agreements) than the original complaint (tortious interference and slander), and because replevin venue is statutorily determined by the location of the property.
[1] A counterclaim to enforce a promissory note, security agreement, and guaranty agreement is not a compulsory counterclaim to a complaint for tortious interference with a c…
[2] The venue for an action seeking replevin of property is the county in which the property is located.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“First, we do not believe Seafirst's counterclaim was compulsory and thus there was no basis to preclude Seafirst from deciding to sue to replevy the aircraft and for damages in Palm Beach County where the aircraft was located.”
Establishes the court's holding that the counterclaim was not compulsory, permitting Seafirst to file the separate replevin action in the county where the property was located.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSeafirst sold American Transport an aircraft and took back a promissory note, security agreement, and guaranty agreement. American Transport sued Seaf…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Malicious Interference With Contract cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellants seek reversal of a non-final order of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit denying appellants’ motion to dismiss or alternatively to abate or transfer the action to Broward County on the ground that Broward County was the proper venue of said action.
Briefly, the factual setting is that appel-lee Seafirst sold American Transport an aircraft and took back a promissory note, a security agreement and a guaranty agree ment. Thereafter appellants sued Seafirst in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for damages for malicious interference with a contract between appellants American and Bachner and for slander. Seafirst filed a counterclaim seeking to enforce a promissory note, a security agreement and a guaranty agreement that were allegedly in default. While that suit was pending, Seafirst filed suit for replevin and damages in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit against appellants, American and Chappell, and thereafter dismissed its counterclaim in the suit pending in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Appellants moved to dismiss the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit suit contending that the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit was the proper venue of the action. From a denial of said motion, this non-final appeal was perfected.
Appellants contend that the counterclaim filed by Seafirst in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit was a compulsory counterclaim and thus the venue therefor was Broward County. We disagree. First, we do not believe Seafirst’s counterclaim was compulsory and thus there was no basis to preclude Seafirst from deciding to sue to replevy the aircraft and for damages in Palm Beach County where the aircraft was located. We reach that conclusion because 1) the complaint in Broward County was for tortious interference with a contract and for slander, whereas, the counterclaim initially filed by Seafirst was to enforce a promissory note and security and guaranty agreements and 2) the venue for replevin by statute is the county in which the property is located. Thus, neither-Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170(a) (1983), nor the logical relationship test referred to in Neil v. South Florida Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), required the original counterclaim to be filed in Broward County, nor was the claim for replevin and damages required to be filed there.
Accordingly, we affirm the order appealed from.
AFFIRMED.
DOWNEY, LETTS and GLICKSTEIN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Maye G. Neil v. S. Fla. Auto Painters, Inc., 397 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Am. AIR Transp., Inc. v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 452 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)