BETTY SUE STANLEY ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
v.
GENERAL FOODS CORPORATION, MAXWELL HOUSE DIVISION, DEFENDANT-THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. ALLIED FOOD WORKERS DISTRICT UNION 103 ET AL., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The union did not breach its duty of fair representation by refusing to arbitrate the grievance when further action would have been fruitless.
Stanley was discharged for violating an absentee policy. Her union refused to arbitrate her grievance after the company denied reinstatement and the a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Breach Of Duty Of Fair Representation cases and more on FLexlaw
[*275] PER CURIAM:
Betty Sue Stanley appeals from the judgment of the district court which found her union had not breached its duty of fair representation. We think the court was correct, and therefore, affirm.
The facts which gave rise to this dispute began in December, 1971, when Stanley was discharged for failure to comply with General Foods’ Absentee and Lateness procedure. The validity of that procedure, then undergoing arbitrator scrutiny, was upheld under the existing contract as a reasonable factory rule. Stanley challenged the fairness of the procedure, charging that it was administered unfairly. When the union refused to arbitrate her claim, she sued General Foods, requesting the court to compel arbitration. Her union, Allied Food Workers (AFL-CIO) was eventually drawn into the suit, and defended on the ground that it had not breached its duty of fair representation, the threshold issue below. We agree.
A review of the record shows that Stanley did not contest the correctness of the points assessed against her. Furthermore, her prior record showed three previous suspensions for absenteeism, falsification of records and negligence on the job. Although the union requested that she remain on the job, the company refused. The matter proceeded to a Step III grievance meeting but the company continued to refuse her reinstatement. When the validity of the absence procedure was eventually upheld in a separate arbitration proceeding, the union felt that a further pursuit of Stanley’s case would be meritless. Stanley’s contention that her discharge resulted from sex discrimination did not become clear until trial and is belied by the record below. During the grievance procedure itself, nothing concerning such discrimination was voiced and the union proceeded on its belief and Stanley’s initial assertion that the absentee procedure was unreasonable.
Under the circumstances, it appears the union met their obligation of fair representation by pursuing her grievance to a point where further action would have been fruitless. The union is not under an absolute duty to pursue a grievance through arbitration and a breach of duty is not established merely by proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Turner v. Air Transport Dispatchers’ Association, 5 Cir., 1972, 468 F. 2d 297, 299-300. We cannot say that the union’s conduct here was discriminatory or unfair. Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bache v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 840 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1988)
Authorities Cited
- Isbell Enters., Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co. OF NEW York, 431 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1970)
- Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1967)
- Turner v. AIR Transp. Dispatchers' Ass'n, 468 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1972)