CAROL OSTYN, APPELLANT,
v.
LUCILLE OLYMPIC, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-09-19
No. 83-2082
RYDER, C.J., and OTT, J., concur.
455 So. 2d 1137 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In a quiet title action, the court reversed summary judgment for the defendant spouse and held that a surviving spouse's homestead right does not attach to property owned by the deceased spouse as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, because the deceased spouse had no individual property interest at death to which homestead could apply.


Holding

A homestead right does not attach to property owned as joint tenants with right of survivorship because upon the death of one joint tenant, that tenant has no individual property interest remaining to which homestead could attach. The surviving joint tenant takes the entire interest by operation of law.


Headnotes

[1] A surviving spouse's homestead right does not attach to property owned by the decedent and another person as joint tenants with right of survivorship.

[2] A homestead exemption applies only to the beneficial interest owned by the head of a family.

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Key Quotes

“While it is not necessary that the entire estate in property be vested in one occupying land as a homestead before it may be impressed as homestead in character, the homestead exemption applies only to the beneficial interest owned by the head of a family.”

Establishes the fundamental principle that homestead rights attach only to beneficial interests actually owned by the family head

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Facts & Procedural History

In 1971, Steve Olympic executed a deed conveying property to himself and three others (including his sister, brother-in-law, and niece Carol Ostyn) as…

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Opinion of the Court
DANAHY, Judge.

DANAHY, Judge.

In an action to quiet title to real property, the plaintiff appeals a final summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We reverse.

The facts appear not to be in dispute. In 1971 Steve Olympic, a single man at that time, executed a deed conveying the property in question to himself and three other persons as joint tenants with right of sur-vivorship. Two of these other persons were Steve Olympic’s sister and brother-in-law. The third person was his sister’s daughter, Steve Olympic’s niece, and the plaintiff in this suit.

Steve Olympic’s sister and brother-in-law died, and then Steve Olympic died on August 22, 1982. The defendant had married Steve Olympic on September 12, 1975, and they resided on the property as their marital home. The defendant is currently in possession of the premises.

The plaintiff brought this suit to establish her ownership of the property as sole surviving joint tenant. On the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge entered an order adjudging that the defendant’s “homestead right” as Steve Olympic’s surviving spouse attached to the marital home acquired by her husband pri-or to their marriage and that right intervened with the rights of the plaintiff as surviving joint owner of the property. The court then declared that the plaintiff's rights as surviving joint tenant vested upon the death of Steve Olympic but subject to a life estate in the defendant as Steve Olympic’s surviving spouse. We can discern no basis for the trial judge’s ruling in this case. While it is not necessary that the entire estate in property be vested in one occupying land as a homestead before it may be impressed as homestead in character, the homestead exemption applies only to the beneficial interest owned by the head of a family. Tullis v. Tullis, 342 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), approved, 360 So. 2d 375 (1978). Our supreme court early held that where a marital residence is owned by spouses as tenants by the entireties, it becomes upon the death of one spouse the sole property of the remaining spouse to the exclusion of the heirs of the decedent, even though occupied during the lifetime of both parties as a homestead. The court said: “The homestead provisions of the Constitution adopted for the benefit of heirs of the head of a family to take effect upon his demise do not apply to such property and it may be disposed of by tenants by the entireties as may any other property not exclusively owned by the head of a family and occupied by him as a homestead.” Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla.1950).1 The same reasoning applies, in our view, to a marital home jointly owned by the head of a family and a person other than his or her spouse.

There is no dispute that the marital home of the defendant and Steve Olympic was in fact owned by him and the plaintiff as joint tenants with right of survivorship, an estate which can be created in Florida. § 689.15, Fla. Stat. (1983). Accordingly, on Steve Olympic's death, there was no property interest then owned by him to which a homestead interest could attach for the benefit of the defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand with directions to enter final judgment for the plaintiff.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

RYDER, C.J., and OTT, J., concur. . The holding of the supreme court in Denham v. Sexton, supra, is now part of Florida statutory law. § 732.401(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). That section of the statutes was enacted in 1975. Ch. 75-220, § 17, Laws of Fla.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …De Rosa claimed title to the property when her son died. Mr. Mar-ger forcefully argues that the house should have homestead status for the benefit of the children. We conclude that the trial court correctly applied our precedent in Ostyn v. Olympic, 455 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), in holding that the house was not homestead and became the sole property of Harriet S. De Rosa at the instant of her son’s death. In Ostyn, the decedent was unmarried when he executed a deed conveying his home to himself and thr…

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