JOSEPH COVELLO, A/K/A DEMUS, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the defendant was not entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule because he was not formally arrested or taken into custody within the meaning of the rule, despite being detained for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Police executed a search warrant and detained the defendant in his home at gunpoint, handcuffed, and photographed. He was later released and not forma…
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[*1322] PER CURIAM.
We reject Covello’s contention that he was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule. We affirm.
Executing a search warrant, police held Covello in his home at gunpoint. He was handcuffed, not permitted to move from his chair or to smoke a cigarette, and was photographed. He was released, however, and was therefore not entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule, Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191; D.L.M. v. State, 397 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); he was not taken into custody within the meaning of the rule.
Florida courts, addressing the issue of custody and speedy trial considerations, have uniformly held that a defendant is not in custody until he has been formally arrested, Williams v. State, 382 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Robbins, 359 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), or held for “something more than an investigatory detention,” State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), citing Snead, v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla.1977). Defendant Covello was clearly in custody for fourth amendment purposes, but was not in custody under the speedy trial rule.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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State v. Lail, 687 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…ustody for speedy trial purposes does not necessarily mean that a defendant must be formally arrested, it does mean something more than an investigatory detention. See State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also Covello v. State, 455 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Custody for Fourth Amendment purposes, however, does not constitute custody for speedy trial purposes. See Griffin v. State, 474 So. 2d 777 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986). See also S…
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T.S. v. State, 574 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Ellison v. State, 547 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), quashed in part on other grounds, 561 So. 2d 576 (Fla.1990); Berry v. State, 547 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Covello v. State, 455 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Dominique v. State, 435 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Marasa v. State, 394 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 613 (Fla.1981); Getsie v. State, 193 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 464 (Fla…
Authorities Cited
- Snead v. State, 346 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- State v. Robbins, 359 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Toyota Motor Sales v. Ortiz, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Burke v. Charles B. Esher, Inc., 397 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- State v. Christian, 442 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Williams v. State, 382 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)