METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD T. MOLLOY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Metropolitan Dade County appealed from a trial court order vacating a grievance panel's decision denying Molloy back pay and reducing his classification. The appellate court affirmed the vacation of the reclassification portion but reversed the vacation of the back pay denial, finding the panel exceeded its jurisdiction in addressing Molloy's classification but that Molloy failed to properly challenge the panel's composition.
The panel exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering a change in Molloy's classification, which was not a necessary sub-issue to back pay entitlement and was not properly framed or tried. However, Molloy failed to demonstrate prejudice regarding the panel's composition sufficient to vacate the back pay denial under Florida Statutes § 682.13(1)(d), so the vacation of that portion was improper.
[1] A party must demonstrate prejudice to justify vacating a grievance panel decision regarding back pay entitlement, absent proper objection to the panel's composition or pr…
[2] A grievance panel exceeds its jurisdiction when it orders a change in an employee's classification, as this issue is distinct from the employee's entitlement to back pay.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This record is devoid of any proper objection by Molloy regarding the composition of the grievance panel or the procedures it employed, nor did Molloy demonstrate any prejudice which satisfies the requirements of section 682.13(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), which would justify the vacation of the panel decision determining no entitlement to back pay.”
Establishes that Molloy failed to properly challenge the panel's composition and lacked statutory grounds to vacate the back pay denial.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMolloy was transferred from the County's exempt service to classified service and placed at the wrong pay step three years earlier. The Personnel Dire…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Metropolitan Dade County (County) appeals from an order granting Edward Mol- loy’s motion to vacate a decision of the Dade County Career Service Grievance Appeal Panel. For the reasons which follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Molloy complained that he had been placed at the wrong pay step three years earlier when he was transferred from the County’s “exempt” service to its “classified” service; the County’s Personnel Director reclassified Molloy to a higher pay step and directed that Molloy’s salary be adjusted prospectively. Molloy, following County procedure, filed a grievance alleging he was entitled to back pay.
The grievance panel entered its award finding that Molloy was not entitled to back pay and, further, that he should be reclassified to his former lower-paying position. Molloy filed an action in the circuit court seeking to vacate the arbitration award. The trial court granted the relief requested, bottoming its decision on the grounds that the grievance panel was improperly constituted and that the panel exceeded its jurisdiction in reducing Molloy’s classification.
This record is devoid of any proper objection by Molloy regarding the composition of the grievance panel or the procedures it employed, nor did Molloy demonstrate any prejudice which satisfies the requirements of section 682.13(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), which would justify the vacation of the panel decision determining no entitlement to back pay. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Walton, 384 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 364 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
The trial court correctly determined that the panel exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering in its award a change in Molloy’s present classification.
The correctness of Molloy’s reclassification was not a necessary sub-issue to Mol-loy’s entitlement to back pay, was not framed by the pleadings, tried by consent, or otherwise put into issue by Dr. Molloy and, therefore, it was error for the grievance panel to decide this issue and reduce Molloy’s classification as a result. See § 682.13(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981); G&N Construction Co. v. Kirpatovsky, 181 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
The trial court’s order is affirmed to the extent that it vacates that portion of the grievance panel’s award reducing Molloy’s classification and reversed to the extent it grants Molloy a new hearing to reargue his entitlement to back pay.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
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Bacon Fam. P'rs, L.P. v. Apollo Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 852 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…nt to rule 1.820(h). The trial court should also have permitted Bacon to amend its answer to reallege the Counterclaim, which was then properly before the court to be tried. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190. The decision in Metropolitan Dade County v. Molloy, 456 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), cited by the Association in support of its position, is not to the contrary. The Molloy case involved a trial court decision that vacated an arbitration award made by the Dade County Grievance Appeal Panel. In pertinent part, the…
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Ira Paul v. The Sch. Bd. OF Miami-Dade Cnty., 751 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…xclusive right to submit grievances to arbitration, a public employer is not obligated to process an individual’s grievance to arbitration if the certified bargaining agent has declined to advance the grievance”); Metropolitan Dade County v. Molloy, 456 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)(error for grievance panel to decide issue not framed by pleadings, not tried by consent, or not put into issue by grievant); School Board of Seminole County v. Cornelison, 406 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)(arbitrator lacks author…
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Markowitz v. City OF Miami, 56 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…inole County v. Comelison, 406 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (holding that an arbitrator lacks the authority to revise an agreement in a manner the parties did not contemplate and to which they did not assent); see also Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Molloy, 456 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (finding it error for a grievance panel to decide an issue not framed by pleadings, not tried by consent, or not put into issue by the grievant). Therefore, we entirely agree with the trial court’s ruling, that “[t]he arbitrator…
Authorities Cited
- G & N Constr. Co. v. Sergi V. Kirpatovsky and Nona J. Kirpatovsky, 181 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Jess Parrish Mem'l Hosp. v. Fla. Pub. Emps. Relations Comm'n & Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 364 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
- The Travelers Indem. Co. v. Walton, 384 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)