STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK GERARD LITTLEFIELD, APPELLEE
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The court held that when a defendant objects to a continuance sought by co-defendants and asserts readiness for trial, the state must seek an extension under speedy trial rules or justify not severing the cases.
[1] A defendant's speedy trial rights may be violated if continuances granted to co-defendants are automatically applied to them without the state seeking an extension.
[2] When a defendant objects to a continuance that would violate their speedy trial rights, the state must demonstrate a reason not to sever the cases or seek an extension.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant was arrested and charged with marijuana possession along with nine co-defendants. When the co-defendants sought and received continuance…
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ANSTEAD, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from a final judgment discharging appellee, Mark Gerard Little-field, due to a speedy trial violation.
Littlefield was arrested on January 20, 1983. He and nine other defendants were charged in a single information with possession of marijuana. On March 31, at a trial status call before the court eight of the defendants announced that they were not ready for trial and sought continuances. The state agreed that the continuances should be granted. Littlefield announced that he was ready for trial and objected to his trial being continued. Subsequently, over Littlefield’s objection, the case as to all ten defendants was postponed. On August 2, Littlefield moved for discharge for the failure of the state to bring him to trial within the 180 days provided in the speedy trial rule. This motion was granted, and the state appeals.
The trial court ruled that prior to the expiration of the 180 days the state should have sought an extension due to exceptional circumstances under rule 3.191(f)(5):
Exceptional Circumstances. As permitted by (d)(2) of this Rule, the court may order an extension of the time periods provided under this Rule where exceptional circumstances are shown to exist. Exceptional circumstances shall not include general congestion of the court’s docket, lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or other avoidable or foreseeable delays.
Exceptional circumstances are those which as a matter of substantial justice to the accused or the State or both require an order by the court: Such circumstances include ... (5) a showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a co-defendant, where there is reason not to sever the cases in order to proceed promptly with trial of the defendant ....
The state contends that it had no obligation to seek an extension and that discharge is barred by rule 3.191 (d)(3)(ii):
Delay and Continuances; Effect on Motion. If trial of the accused does not commence within the periods of time established by this Rule, a pending motion for discharge shall be granted by the court unless it is shown that ... (ii) the failure to hold trial is attributable to the accused, a co-defendant in the same trial, or their counsel ....
The state argues that since the failure to bring Littlefield to trial was caused by continuances taken by his codefendants Little-field is not entitled to discharge.
In Grimett v. State, 383 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980), this court held that a code-fendant’s unanticipated, failure to appear at trial and a consequent order of continuance because of the nonappearance was a sufficient basis to deny Grimett’s subsequent motion for discharge. On the other hand, the Second District has suggested that a defendant’s speedy trial rights should always be given precedence over the state’s right to jointly try defendants charged in the same crime. Machado v. State, 431 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.152(b)(l)(i) provides that a severance should be granted if necessary to protect speedy trial rights:
(b) Severance of defendants.
(1) On motion of the State or a defendant, the court shall order a severance of defendants and separate trials:
(i) before trial, upon a showing that such order is necessary to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, or is appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants ....
In the present case, neither Littlefield nor the state moved to sever Littlefield from the other defendants prior to the expiration of the speedy trial time.
Having considered all three provisions of the criminal rules relating to the potential conflict between defendant’s speedy trial rights and the state’s right to consolidation, we believe the trial court acted properly in this case in placing the burden on the state to seek an extension under the provisions of rule 3.191(f)(5).
By making accommodation of a codefendant a basis for an extension, the provisions of rule 3.191(f) imply that the state must affirmatively request an extension, if such a situation is contemplated, in advance of the expiration of the speedy trial time. Under this procedure, the trial court can deal with the specific situation and balance the interests of the state in avoiding multiple trials against the interest of the defendant in receiving a speedy trial. Of course, the defendant is also entitled to seek a severance under rule 3.152(b)(l)(i) and in doing so the same factors may be considered by the trial court. In effect, by asserting that he was ready to go to trial and wanted to go to trial even if tried alone, and that he would not waive his speedy trial rights, we believe Littlefield was seeking a severance and that he made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to such by showing that his speedy trial rights would be violated if his codefend-ants’ continuances were forced on him. See Rule 3.152(b)(l)(i) and Machado v. State. When Littlefield objected to having his trial continued beyond the speedy trial time we believe it was the obligation of the state to respond by demonstrating that despite the speedy trial consequences to defendant “there is reason not to sever the cases.” See Rule 3.191(f)(5). This the state failed to do.
If the state had no obligation to seek an extension when it was aware of the need for delay to accommodate other defendants, then the state could simply rely on continuances extended to codefendants, whether or not there were sufficient reasons to also extend the non-movant’s speedy trial time, as a means to avoid the non-movant’s speedy trial rights. Such automatic reliance, in our view, ignores the scheme suggested by rule 3.191(f)(5) and violates the individual defendant’s speedy trial rights. Here, the state was well aware of the codefendants’ need for continuances and of defendant’s objection thereto. The problem was not an unexpected one as was involved in Grimett. However, the state merely concurred in the requests for continuances and took no action to secure an extension as it had a right to do under rule 3.191(f)(5).
Accordingly, we affirm the order of discharge.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
DELL, J., dissents without opinion.
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RICO v. State, 463 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)…cy in this case in which we conclude that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was paramount. As we have said, the state made no showing of a reason not to sever. See Machado v. State, 431 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also State v. Littlefield, 457 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), where the Fourth District Court of Appeal pointed out that a defendant makes a prima facie showing of his entitlement to a severance by a showing that his speedy trial rights would be violated if co-defendants’ motions for a con…
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Martin v. Honorable Manuel Menendez, Jr., 467 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…, 1984, and he then sought relief by his petition for writ of prohibition filed with this court. We believe that Judge Boardman’s well-written and often-cited decision in Machado v. State, 431 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) and State v. Littlefield, 457 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), wherein the defendants were discharged due to speedy trial violations, are both distinguishable and instructive. In Machado, the codefendants were each charged in separate informations and their cases later consolidated pursuan…
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Bustos v. The Honorable J. Leonard Fleet, 461 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…LETTS, Judge. We grant the rehearing motion. Our opinion filed November 28, 1984 is substituted by the following: The Writ of Prohibition is granted on the authority of State v. Littlefield, 457 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Nevertheless, because the issue presented here arises frequently and has considerable impact on the administration of justice, we certify the following question of great public importance: IS THE CONVENIENCE TO THE STATE OF TR…
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- Aristides MacHado v. State, 431 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Griffin v. PAN Am. Bank OF Orlando, 383 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)