STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
T.L.W., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the suppression of cocaine evidence that was consumed during chemical testing by the state chemist. The court held that the destruction of evidence during legitimate chemical analysis does not constitute a due process violation, and therefore reversed the suppression order.
The court held that: (1) the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause applies only to witnesses, not physical evidence, so the defendant's confrontation claim fails; and (2) where suspect contraband is unavoidably destroyed or consumed during legitimate chemical testing, there is no due process violation, provided the destruction was not intentional, negligent, or designed to deprive the defendant of an opportunity to perform independent testing.
[1] The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment applies to witnesses, not physical evidence.
[2] Destruction of suspect drugs by the state constitutes a due process violation only if it is intentional or negligent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the confrontation provision of the sixth amendment refers to witnesses and does not encompass physical evidence”
Establishes that Sixth Amendment confrontation rights do not protect against destruction of physical evidence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe state chemist performed a chemical analysis of suspect drugs and consumed the entire sample during testing. At the time of testing, the chemist be…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, the State of Florida, contends that the evidence of appellee’s possession of cocaine was improperly suppressed. We agree.
In an oral motion in limine, appellee alleged that because the state consumed all of the suspect drugs during testing, she had been deprived of her sixth amendment right to confrontation of witnesses against her and her right to due process of law under the state and federal constitutions.
At the hearing on appellee’s motion, the forensic chemist testified that at the time she performed the chemical analysis, she believed it was necessary to consume the entire sample to obtain a meaningful scientific result. On cross-examination, at the urging of counsel, she speculated that, with difficulty, she could have scraped a small amount of the suspect drug aside. She went on to say, however, that she was concerned with a qualitative, not a quantitative result.
Appellee’s sixth amendment claim must fail. We reiterate that the confrontation provision of the sixth amendment refers to witnesses and does not encompass physical evidence. Strahorn v. State, 436 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), citing State v. Armstrong, 363 So. 2d 38, 39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also State v. Atkins, 369 So. 2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
As to appellee’s second argument, we recognize that intentional or negligent destruction of suspect drugs by the state or its agents, constitutes a due process violation. State v. Atkins, 369 So. 2d at 390, citing State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 459 (Fla.1979). However, where suspect contraband drugs are unavoidably destroyed or consumed during chemical testing by a state chemist, there is no suppression of evidence entailing a due process violation. Atkins at 390; see also, Stra-horn.
Here, the state chemist believed use of the entire sample was necessary to obtain valid scientific results. The sample was consumed legitimately in the performance of the chemist’s duties. The sample was not negligently destroyed, nor was it destroyed with the intent to deprive appel- lee of an opportunity to perform an independent test. Strahorn.
Accordingly, on the basis of Strahorn, Atkins and Herrera, we hold that the order granting the motion in limine be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.
GRIMES, J., concurs.
RYDER, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
RYDER, Chief Judge,
concurring specialty-
Although there is nothing in the record to indicate that the state chemist either intentionally or negligently destroyed the suspected cocaine during testing, she testified that, in fact, she could have saved some of the drug but with difficulty. Although I have no reason to believe that the chemist did not make anything but an honest decision to consume the entire sample during testing, I feel compelled to re-emphasize the teachings of State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 459 (Fla.1979). It is a better practice for the state to preserve a portion of the suspected drug for examination by the defense or to delay testing of small amounts of suspected drugs until a defense representative is given a fair opportunity to be present. Also, by following this procedure, the credibility of the state chemist cannot be successfully attacked at trial for failing to allow examination of the drug by the defendant.
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Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. 2003)…n bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Additionally, Florida courts have held that the unavoidable consumption of testing material does not trigger a constitutional violation. See State v. T.L.W., 457 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d [*1221] 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Therefore, as Gordon has neither asserted a claim of bad faith nor explained any prejudice in this instance, he is not entitled to relief here. INTERNATIONAL LAW Gord…
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Meryl S. McDONALD v. State, 952 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 2006)…n bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Additionally, Florida courts have held that the unavoidable consumption of testing material does not trigger a constitutional violation. See State v. T.L.W., 457 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Therefore, as Gordon has neither asserted a claim of bad faith nor explained any prejudice in this instance, he is not entitled to relief here. Next, Gordon argues that trial…
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State v. Farr, 558 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)…im in this case for the purpose of discovering or evaluating the physical evidence that a crime has occurred. Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment refers to witnesses and does not encompass physical evidence, State v. T. L. W., 457 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), State v. Armstrong, 363 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), federal decisions hold that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and fundamental fairness entitles a defendant access to relevant and material evidence which is neces…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- State v. Armstrong, 363 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Strahorn v. State, 436 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Rodgers v. Sadler, 369 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Liberace Atkins, 369 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)