MACK B. TRAMMELL, APPELLANT,
v.
CORAL RIDGE INTERIORS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1984-10-17
No. 84-1728
HERSEY and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
457 So. 2d 593 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Coral Ridge Interiors sued Tennessee resident Trammell for nonpayment under a contract for merchandise sale, obtaining jurisdiction through Florida's long arm statute. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish personal jurisdiction because it did not specify where payment or delivery was to occur.


Holding

The complaint was legally insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute because it failed to allege where delivery and payment were to occur, making it impossible to determine whether the case fell within the statute's requirements, and therefore personal service on the defendant outside the state could not establish jurisdiction absent adequate allegations.


Headnotes

[1] A complaint alleging breach of contract must contain sufficient allegations to establish that the breach occurred within the forum state to justify service under the long…

[2] A plaintiff cannot rely on the rule that payment is due where the creditor resides to establish jurisdiction under the long-arm statute when the contract does not specify…

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Key Quotes

“The complaint does not allege where delivery is to take place, therefore one cannot determine where payment is to be made. Thus, appellee's reliance on Engineered Storage Systems... for the general rule that payment is due where the creditor resides absent some other designated place is inapplicable.”

Establishes that the missing allegation regarding delivery location was fatal to the complaint's adequacy for jurisdictional purposes.

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Facts & Procedural History

Coral Ridge Interiors, a Florida corporation, sued Trammell, a Tennessee resident, in four counts (breach of contract, open account, account stated, a…

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Opinion of the Court
DOWNEY, Judge.

DOWNEY, Judge.

Appellee sued appellant in four counts for nonpayment of money allegedly owed under a contract for the sale of merchandise. Service of process was obtained via the long arm statute, Chapter 48, Florida Statutes (1984).

The complaint alleged that plaintiff is a Florida corporation and defendant is a resident of the State of Tennessee. It contains four counts: breach of contract, open account, account stated, and goods sold. Each count is based upon a written contract attached as an exhibit, which states: “Payment for Merchandise: All merchandise is handled on a cash on delivery basis.” The complaint does not allege where delivery is to take place, therefore one cannot determine where payment is to be made. Thus, appellee’s reliance on Engineered Storage Systems, Inc. v. National Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), for the general rule that payment is due where the creditor resides absent some other designated place is inapplicable. The complaint is simply inadequate for a court to determine where payment was due and thus inadequate to fall within the provisions of section 48.193(l)(g), Florida Statutes (1984).

One further point appellee makes in its brief needs explanation. It is suggested that Risman v. Whittaker, 326 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), indicates that personal service on a nonresident per section 48.194 should be more effective than service through the Secretary of State as agent for service of process. Therefore, argues appellee, personal service on Appellant Tram-mell in Tennessee with allegations of breach of contract is sufficient to subject Trammell to the jurisdiction of Florida courts pursuant to section 48.193(l)(g).

We suggest appellee has misread Ris-man. Both service through the Secretary of State pursuant to section 48.161 and personal service outside the state pursuant to section 48.194 are available to a plaintiff seeking to obtain jurisdiction under section 48.193, the long arm statute. However, neither is available absent sufficient allegations to bring the case within the purview of section 48.193.

Since appellee’s allegations are totally deficient in this regard, we are compelled to reverse the order appealed from.

REVERSED.

HERSEY and BARKETT, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Kimbrough v. Rowe, 479 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
    …isdiction under section 48.193. Additionally, the mere fact that personal service was made on Kimbrough in his homestate is not sufficient to subject him to jurisdiction in Florida under the Long Arm Statute. Trammell v. Coral Ridge Interiors, Inc., 457 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The second question is whether the personal jurisdiction defense was asserted in an appropriate and timely manner. We find that it was. Kimbrough’s answer contained a motion to dismiss which stated: “[tjhere has been a failure…

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