LEE SWENSEN AND RESPIRATORY EQUIPMENT LEASING AND SALES SERVICE CORPORATION, APPELLANTS,
v.
J. ALLEN LOFTON AND JUDITH A. LOFTON, INDIVIDUALLY, AND DOING BUSINESS AS J.A. LOFTON INTERIORS, APPELLEES
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This is an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction. The appellate court reversed the injunction order, holding that the appellees' application failed to allege sufficient facts to establish irreparable harm as required for equitable relief, and that the lower court order lacked required specific findings of fact.
The court reversed the order granting the temporary injunction because the appellees' application failed to set forth clearly, definitely, and unequivocally sufficient factual allegations to support irreparable damage necessary for equitable intervention. Additionally, the order was improper because it lacked specific reasons as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(d).
[1] An application for a temporary injunction must set forth clear, definite, and unequivocal factual allegations to support a conclusion of irreparable damage.
[2] A temporary injunction is improperly entered when the underlying application fails to provide sufficient factual allegations of irreparable damage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“appellees' application for temporary injunction is insufficient because it fails to set forth clearly, definitely and unequivocally sufficient factual allegations to support appellees' conclusion of "irreparable damage" necessary to warrant intervention of a court of equity”
Establishes the standard for temporary injunctions and the deficiency in appellees' application
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLee Swensen and Respiratory Equipment Leasing and Sales Service Corporation sought to appeal an order granting a temporary injunction in favor of J. A…
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PER CURIAM.
The opinion of the Court dated May 25, 1984, is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted therefor. This is an interlocutory appeal from an order granting a' temporary injunction brought pursuant to Rule of Appellate Pro cedure 9.130(a)(3)(B).
We agree with appellants’ contention that appellees’ application for temporary injunction is insufficient because it fails to set forth clearly, definitely and unequivocally sufficient factual allegations to support appellees’ conclusion of “irreparable damage” necessary to warrant intervention of a court of equity. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, 118 So. 2d 541 (Fla.1960); F.V. Investments, N.V. v. Sicma Corp., 415 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Quadomain Condominium Association v. Pomerantz, 341 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); First National Bank in St. Petersburg v. Ferris, 156 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963). For this reason we conclude that the temporary injunction was improperly entered.
Accordingly, we reverse the order with directions to dissolve the temporary injunction issued pursuant to such application.
Additionally, we note that the order as rendered is improper and provides an additional ground for reversal because it lacks any specific reasons for entry of the temporary injunction as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(d). F.V. Investments, N.V. v. Sicma Corp.; Seashore Club of Atlantic City v. Tessler, 405 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). We further note that earlier in these proceedings this court entered an order striking this point from our consideration. Our order was predicated upon the parties’ assertions that a transcript and an amended order with specific findings of fact would be provided to this court and that, therefore, this issue would be moot.
However, neither the transcript nor such an amended order was ever presented to this court.
Therefore, we are unwilling to use the error of the defective order as an additional ground for reversal because of our prior ruling in this case. The motion for rehearing and clarification is granted to the extent of this opinion and otherwise denied.
OTT, A.C.J., and DANAHY and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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City OF Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co., 634 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…n is insufficient ... [if] it fails to set forth clearly, definitely and unequivocally sufficient factual allegations to support ... [the] conclusion of ‘irreparable damage’ necessary to warrant intervention of a court of equity.” Swensen v. Lofton, 457 So. 2d 1069,1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (citations omitted). Clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of the four conclusions necessary to justify entry of a preliminary injunction. Premature Adjudication Improper Whether t…
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Leposky v. EGO (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)…ternal quotation marks omitted). We reverse the order freezing Appellant’s assets for three reasons. First, the guardian’s motion failed to contain sufficient factual allegations to support entry of a temporary injunction. See Swensen v. Lofton, 457 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (reversing a temporary injunction because the motion failed to set forth sufficient factual allegations to support a showing of irreparable damage). Second, the guardianship court violated Appellant’s due process rights by n…
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Bentley v. Levine, 507 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…d do equity toward the defendant. Taylor v. Rawlins, 86 Fla. 279, 97 So. 714 (1923). Moreover, the injunction in the case at bar did not specify the reasons for its entry, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610(c). Swensen v. Lofton, 457 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). The order granting the temporary injunction is therefore reversed. HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS and STONE, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cramp v. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Orange Cnty., 118 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1960)
- Polakow v. Bone & Schultz Corp., 156 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- The First Nat'l Bank IN ST. Petersburg v. Ferris, 156 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Quadomain Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Pomerantz, 341 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Seashore Club OF Atl. City, Inc. v. Manley Tessler, 405 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)
- F. v. Investments, 415 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)