UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
RONALD LEE HARPER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II narcotic drug under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) is not arbitrary or irrational, and thus the conviction stands.
Petitioner Ronald Lee Harper was convicted of possession and dispensing of cocaine. He appealed, arguing that the classification of cocaine as a Sched…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Controlled Substance Classification cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the conviction of petitioner Ronald Lee Harper for possession and dispensing of cocaine, rejecting his sole contention on appeal that the classification of cocaine as a Schedule II narcotic drug under 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) is arbitrary and irrational.
Numerous district courts have recently dealt with this argument. United States v. Amidzich, 396 F.Supp. 1140, 1147 (E. D.Wis.1975); United States v. Hobbs, 392 F.Supp. 444, 446 (D.Mass.1975); United States v. DiLaura, 394 F.Supp. 770, 773 (D.Mass.1974); United States v. Brookins, 383 F.Supp. 1212, 1217 (D.N.J. 1974). In all cases, the courts expressed the opinion that Congress had acted upon a constitutionally “rational basis” according to the test of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234, 1242 (1938), in so classifying cocaine for the purpose of imposing penalties. See also United States v. Smaldone, 484 F. 2d 311, 319-20 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 1411, 39 L.Ed.2d 469 (1974) and United States v. Miller, 387 F.Supp. 1097, 1098 (D.Conn.1975), where slightly different reasoning nonetheless led the courts to the same conclusion that Congress had not acted arbitrarily.
Petitioner’s reliance upon the district court’s decision in United States v. Castro, 401 F.Supp. 120 (N.D.Ill.1975), is misplaced. The court found no fundamental right of defendant involved1 and therefore reasoned that the “rational basis” test of Carolene, supra, must be applied. The court then cited the language of Brookins, supra, observing that continuing medical debate, potential for societal harm, and general uncertainty as to whether Congress classified cocaine on more of a penal or medical basis, were grounds that could constitute the required rational basis for sustaining the statute. Although sympathetic to the argument that cocaine was misclassified as a narcotic, the court concluded that the consideration of any unresolved questions was better left to Congress and the Attorney General. We agree and affirm the conviction.
. See Duffy v. Wells, 201 F. 2d 503 (9th Cir. 1953).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977)
-
United States v. Odell Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1976)
-
United States v. James A. Whitley (83-5428), 734 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1984)
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1938)
- United States v. Smaldone, 484 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1973)
- Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 415 U.S. 915 (U.S. 1974)
- Baron v. Superior Court of Cal., 415 U.S. 915 (U.S. 1974)
- Duffy v. Wells, 201 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1952)