MILDRED M. FILKINS, APPELLANT,
v.
HARRY A. FILKINS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a dissolution of marriage after 29 years, the court reversed the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony to a homemaker wife, holding that she lacked the capacity for self-support within the prescribed period and thus was entitled to consideration for permanent periodic alimony based on her needs and the husband's ability to pay.
The court reversed and held that rehabilitative alimony presupposes actual or potential capacity for self-support within the prescribed period commensurate with the party's accustomed standard of living. Because the wife, with an eleventh-grade education and no work history in 29 years, had little to no chance of becoming self-supporting within three years, the trial court must reconsider the award and address permanent alimony based on the wife's needs and the husband's ability to provide.
[1] Rehabilitative alimony requires a demonstrated actual or potential capacity for self-support within the prescribed period commensurate with the party's accustomed standar…
[2] A party lacking the capacity for self-support cannot be rehabilitated.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An award of rehabilitative alimony to a party presupposes the actual or potential capacity for self-support within the prescribed period commensurate with the party's accustomed standard of living.”
Establishes the legal standard for rehabilitative alimony awards and the requirement that the recipient have realistic capacity for independence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 29 years. The husband, age 58, was a seaman earning approximately $45,000 annually. The wife, age 57, had been a homemake…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Capacity For Self-Support cases and more on FLexlaw
BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.
In this dissolution of marriage proceeding, appellant/wife contends the trial court abused its discretion ⅛ failing to award her permanent periodic alimony. We agree and therefore reverse.
The parties were divorced after twenty-nine years of marriage. At the time of dissolution, the husband was a fifty-eight-year-old seaman earning an estimated $45,-000 a year. The fifty-seven-year-old wife, on the other hand, had been a homemaker for the duration of the marriage, had raised three children, and possessed an eleventh grade education. The wife has not worked since the beginning of the marriage and is not presently trained for any employment. The wife did testify, however, that three years ago she worked on an assembly line for one day, but the job was too much for her to handle.
The final judgment of dissolution awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony of $1300 per month for twenty-four months, reduced to $500 per month for the next twelve months. The court further awarded to the wife the parties’ marital home in Tampa (estimated value $62,000) and their mobile home lot in Ruskin, Florida (estimated value $10,000). The husband received the parties’ beach house on Anna Maria Island (estimated value $73,000 with a $20,000 mortgage), two lots in Hillsborough County, and $7000 in receivables due from various relatives. A negligible amount of stock was divided equally between the parties.
An award of rehabilitative alimony to a party presupposes the actual or potential capacity for self-support within the prescribed period commensurate with the party’s accustomed standard of living. Maloy v. Maloy, 431 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Holland v. Holland, 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Burke v. Burke, 401 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Wagner v. Wagner, 383 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); and Messer v. Messer, 342 So. 2d 1076 (Fla.2d DCA 1977). Without this capacity there is nothing to which one can be rehabilitated. See, e.g., Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 20 (Fla.1976); Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Here, in view of the facts that appellant has less than a high school education and has not worked in twenty-nine years, there is little, if any, chance that she will be self-supporting within three years, certainly not to the standard of living she enjoyed while married.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court with directions to revisit the question of permanent alimony based on the wife’s needs and the husband’s ability to provide for those needs. We affirm the final judgment of dissolution in all other respects.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Mundy v. Madison Lee Mundy, Jr., 498 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…s the potential or capacity to be rehabilitated “to a financial stature that would permit her to become self-supporting.” Allison v. Allison, 491 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Sever v. Sever, 467 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Filkins v. Filkins, 458 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Courts are in agreement that it is an abuse of discretion to award rehabilitative alimony to a wife who has no present abili [*540] ty to support herself and no reasonable prospect that she could do so in the near future. The fa…
-
Hatcher v. Hatcher, 533 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…ot support a finding that the wife could develop the capacity for self-support. Accordingly, we reverse on this issue and remand for entry of an order converting the award of temporary rehabilitative alimony to permanent alimony. Filkins v. Filkins, 458 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Malay v. Maloy, 431 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); St. Laurent v. St Laurent, 417 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We find no error as to the remaining issues. The trial court…
-
Johnson v. Johnson, 537 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)…id not specifically request rehabilitative alimony, but rather asked that the alimony be made permanent. Rehabilitative alimony is appropriate only where the receiving party has the actual or potential capacity for self support. Filkins v. Fil-kins, 458 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). However, the wife’s own pleadings allege, and the evidence she presented indicates, that she is incapable of self-support. The trial court thus erred in awarding rehabilitative alimony. We, therefore, reverse that portion of the…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Patterson v. Patterson, 315 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Wagner v. Wagner, 383 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Messer v. Addison L. Messer, 342 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Holland v. Holland, 406 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Maloy v. Maloy, 431 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Burke v. Burke, 401 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)