JOHN LEROY MORROW, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's conviction reversed and discharge ordered because the state failed to bring him to trial within the 180-day speedy trial period under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, and the trial judge failed to enter a timely order extending that period for exceptional circumstances.
A defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 180 days of custody or discharged, and failure to do so requires reversal and discharge even if a trial judge's erroneous order in another case purported to extend the period.
[1] A trial scheduling conference is neither a trial date nor a proceeding requiring the defendant's presence, and the defendant's failure to attend does not establish unavai…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMorrow was charged with a felony crime. The state attorney failed to bring him to trial within 180 days of custody, and the trial judge did not enter …
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COWART, Judge.
The “speedy trial” rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, requires that a person charged with a felony crime offense be brought to trial within 180 days of being taken into custody or, upon motion, that he be discharged. Because the state attorney failed to cause the defendant to be tried within the required period of time and the trial judge failed during that time period to enter an order specifically extending that time period for exceptional circumstances, this court must order that he be discharged. The trial judge’s order in another case (erroneously) declaring a statute unconstitutional (see State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904 (Fla.1983)), did not have the effect of automatically extending the speedy trial time period in this case.
A trial scheduling court conference is neither a trial date nor a proceeding at which the presence of the defendant is required by the rules or any order in this case. Therefore, the failure of the defendant and his counsel to attend a trial scheduling conference does not establish that the defendant was unavailable for trial under Rule 3.191(e). See Fulk v. State, 417 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Neither are the operative facts in State v. Kubesh, 378 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), present here.
The judgment of conviction herein is reversed, the sentence vacated and the defendant discharged.
REVERSED.
COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Brown v. State, 695 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…nt was entitled to automatic discharge if not brought to trial [*1281] within the speedy trial period unless, prior to its expiration, the trial court had entered an order extending the period for one of the specified reasons. E.g., Morrow v. State, 458 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The substance of what is now subdivision (p) was added to the rule in 1984. The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules — Criminal Procedure, 462 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla.1984). As this court has previously stated, the intent behind t…
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Clark v. State, 3 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…at Clark was unwilling to proceed to trial until the potential witness had been transported. The failure to hold a trial within the recapture period was not attributable to Clark or his counsel. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191(j)(2); see also Morrow v. State, 458 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (failure of defendant and his counsel to attend trial-scheduling conference did not establish that defendant was unavailable for trial within meaning of the speedy trial rule where trial-scheduling court conference was neither tr…
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Leomar Gonzalez v. State, 536 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…scheduled for the week of August 24-28, 1987 and that “both parties shall advise the court on the 18th day of August, 1987 of the date selected for trial.” Clearly, the defendant was not required to appear in court on August 18. In Morrow v. State, 458 So. 2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the court held that a trial-scheduling conference is not a proceeding at which the defendant’s presence is necessarily required in the absence of an order to that effect. Accordingly, the failure of the defendant and his co…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1983)
- Fulk v. State, 417 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- State v. Kubesh, 378 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)