CHERYL F. SMITH, APPELLANT,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• Rice-Lamar v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 853 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
  …on her disclosure of information. Finally, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the City’s protective order and preventing Lamar from deposing the City’s Mayor and Vice-Mayor. See generally Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(a trial court’s decision to grant, deny, or limit discovery is a matter of discretion which should be set aside only upon a showing of. abuse). The Mayor advised that he would not be inconvenienced by having his deposition t…
• Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Sewell, 150 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)
  …le 1.280(c), governing protective orders, gives the trial court significant discretion in determining whether such potentially cumulative depositions should occur, and, if so, what restrictions should be imposed. See Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“Trial courts must be accorded broad discretion in the treatment of discovery problems through the employment of the protective provisions contemplated by Rule 1.280”). In this case, while the trial court allowed the poten…
• Beekie v. Montgomery Scott Morgan, 751 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)
  …nience, and the need to take time off from work. Aside from that inconvenience, there was no evidence of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Protective orders must be based on good cause. Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Under the facts of this case, all that was warranted was for the court to order the payment of expenses. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). Further, it was Morgan’s attorney who raised the technical objection to the notice form, whic…