WILLIAM M. WAITE, PETITIONER,
v.
WELLINGTON BOATS, INC., RESPONDENT
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William Waite, an unrepresented defendant, sought certiorari review of a trial court's protective order prohibiting him from personally deposing the plaintiff and its officers due to an antagonistic relationship. The appellate court denied the petition, affirming the trial court's broad discretion to issue protective orders under discovery rules.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the protective order. Trial courts have broad discretion in treating discovery problems through protective provisions, and Waite failed to demonstrate that he could not obtain necessary discovery through other available means under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
[1] A trial court has broad discretion in managing discovery disputes and issuing protective orders under Fla.R.Civ.Pr. …
[2] A protective order may restrict the method of discovery if good cause is shown to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Trial courts must be accorded broad discretion in the treatment of discovery problems through the employment of the protective provisions contemplated by Rule 1.280.”
Establishes the standard of review and deference given to trial courts in discovery disputes.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWaite was an unrepresented defendant in a lawsuit brought by Wellington Boats, Inc. An extremely antagonistic relationship had developed between Waite…
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NIMMONS, Judge.
William M. Waite seeks relief, via a petition for certiorari, from the trial court’s protective order precluding Waite, an unrepresented defendant in the court below, from personally deposing by oral examination the plaintiff, Wellington Boats, Inc., and its principal corporate officers because of an extremely antagonistic relationship which has developed between Waite and such officers. We deny the petition.
Fla.R.Civ.Pr. 1.280 provides in relevant part:
“(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from who discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may make any order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense that justice requires, including one or more of the following * * * (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery
Trial courts must be accorded broad discretion in the treatment of discovery problems through the employment of the protective provisions contemplated by Rule 1.280. See Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, 88 So. 2d 551 (Fla.1956); Abelson v. Bosem, 329 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Moreover, petitioner has made no showing that he has been, or will be, unable to obtain needed discovery by other means available under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the requisite good cause to support the Rule 1.280(c) protective order. The petition must therefore be denied as the subject order does not depart from the essential requirements of the law.
Petition Denied.
SHIVERS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
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Rice-Lamar v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 853 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…on her disclosure of information. Finally, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the City’s protective order and preventing Lamar from deposing the City’s Mayor and Vice-Mayor. See generally Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(a trial court’s decision to grant, deny, or limit discovery is a matter of discretion which should be set aside only upon a showing of. abuse). The Mayor advised that he would not be inconvenienced by having his deposition t…
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Racetrac Petroleum, Inc. v. Sewell, 150 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…le 1.280(c), governing protective orders, gives the trial court significant discretion in determining whether such potentially cumulative depositions should occur, and, if so, what restrictions should be imposed. See Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“Trial courts must be accorded broad discretion in the treatment of discovery problems through the employment of the protective provisions contemplated by Rule 1.280”). In this case, while the trial court allowed the poten…
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Beekie v. Montgomery Scott Morgan, 751 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…nience, and the need to take time off from work. Aside from that inconvenience, there was no evidence of annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense. Protective orders must be based on good cause. Waite v. Wellington Boats, Inc., 459 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Under the facts of this case, all that was warranted was for the court to order the payment of expenses. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c). Further, it was Morgan’s attorney who raised the technical objection to the notice form, whic…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Charles Sales Corp. v. Rovenger, 88 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1956)
- Abelson v. Arie Lionel Bosem, 329 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)