ANDREW HEIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant, a prison inmate, was accused of assaulting a fellow inmate with a knife, given Miranda warnings, questioned concerning the incident and placed in administrative detention. Three months later, the appellant was charged with aggravated battery and possession of a weapon by a State prisoner. Appellant moved for discharge of the information alleging that his right to a speedy trial, pursuant to Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1) had been violated as more than 180 days had passed since he was placed in administrative confinement. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.
The appellant contends that placement in administrative confinement as a result of the conduct which later gives rise to charges constitutes an arrest for the purposes of commencing the 180 day speedy trial period. This court has consistently rejected this position. See Powers v. State, 422 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Lynn v. State, 436 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Turner v. State, 442 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
NIMMONS, J., concurs.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents with written opinion.
WENTWORTH, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent and would reverse based on my conclusion that the administrative confinement in this case resulted solely from the conduct giving rise to charges filed more than 180 days after appellant was “miran-dized,” interrogated, and custodially segregated from the inmate population. See concurring opinion of Judge Ervin in Lynn v. State, 436 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
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Holt v. State, 472 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…judgment of acquittal; and III. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing under the guidelines and in departing therefrom. We find no error under Points I and II, and affirm. Specifically, as to Point I, we affirm on the basis of Height v. State, 459 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). However, we do find error under Point III, and therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. We initially disagree with appellant’s position that the trial court improperly applied section 775.084, the habitual fel…
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King v. State, 468 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…ition has been rejected. State v. Miller, 437 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). He next contends that his placement in administrative confinement constituted an “arrest.” This court has consistently refused to adopt this argument. See Height v. State, 459 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Therefore, because King was brought to trial within 180 days of his formal arrest on 20 October 1983, there has been no violation of the speedy trial rule. We also find that none of King’s United States constitutional rights ha…
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Young v. State, 459 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Height v. State, 459 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Powers v. State, 422 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Lynn v. State, 436 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). JOANOS, WIGGINTON and BAR-FIELD, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Turner v. State, 442 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Powers v. State, 422 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)
- Lynn v. State, 436 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)